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Grant R. Hoole* The Forms and Limits of Judicial Inquiry:
Judges as Inquiry Commissioners in Canada
and Australia
In both Canada and Australia the conduct of public inquiries draws heavily from the
expertise of the legal profession, with judges frequently serving as commissioners
and inquiry hearings often reproducing the popular imagery of a courtroom.
Despite this affinity between public inquiries and the legal profession, however,
jurisprudential and academic authorities repeatedly stress that public inquiries
are non-adjudicative. Indeed, the received wisdom is that the investigative focus
of public inquiries justifies their divergence from the procedural and substantive
commitments of adjudication. This paper challenges that assumption. It argues
that the service of judges as inquiry commissioners should be premised on their
fidelity to the basic value of adjudication, a commitment necessary both to honour
the due process rights of inquiry participants and the constitutional principle
of separation of powers. Drawing from constitutional jurisprudence, practical
examples of judicial service on inquiry commissions in Canada and Australia,
and an understanding of adjudicative processes from the perspectives of their
participants, I propose an analytic method to resolve the unique dilemmas faced
by judges as inquiry commissioners. This method speaks directly to the ethics of
judges, reinforcing a connection between their skills, procedural methods, and
commitment to honour the basic principles of a just legal system.
Au Canada et en Australie, le deroulement des enqu~tes publiques repose
lourdement sur les competences de juristes, des juges occupant souvent des
postes de commissaires et le deroulement des audiences etant frequemment
inspire de Iimage que Ion se fait d'une salle de cours. Cependant, en depit
de cette ressemblance entre une enquite publique et la profession juridique,
la jurisprudence et des universitaires reputes affirment de maniere repetee que
les enquites publiques ne donnent pas de pouvoir decisionnel. En effet, Iidee
reque est que lobjectif qui sous-tend la mise sur pied des enquites publiques
justifie que ces dernieres devient des engagements proceduraux et substantiels
de Iarbitrage. L'auteur de Particle conteste cette hypothese. Il pretend que le r6le
des juges en tant que commissaires d'une commission denquote doit reposer
sur leur fidelite a la valeur fondamentale de Iarbitrage, engagement necessaire
non seulement pour respecter le droit a une procedure juste et equitable pour les
participants a I'enqu~te et le principe constitutionnel de separation des pouvoirs.
S'inspirant de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle, d'exemples pratiques de service
judiciaire au sein de commissions denqu~te au Canada et en Australie ainsi
que de sa comprehension du processus decisionnel de la perspective des
participants, Iauteur propose une methode analytique de resolution des dilemmes
uniques que doivent trancher les juges qui siegent comme commissaires
d'enquote. Cette methode fait appel a Iethique des juges et renforce le lien entre
leurs competences, les methodes procedurales et Iengagement a respecter les
principes elementaires d'un systeme juridique equitable.
* PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa (ghooleguottawa.ca). I am grateful to the
editors of the Dalhousie Law Journal and to two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful feedback
on an earlier version of this paper. I am also indebted to Australia's Endeavour Research Fellowship
and to the members of the Gilbert & Tobin Centre of Public Law, University of New South Wales, for
their hospitality and support as I completed the Australian portion of this research Special thanks are
owed to Andrew Lynch and to Rebecca Ananian-Welsl Errors and omissions are mine.
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Introduction
Public inquiries are an important feature of the political landscapes of both
Canada and Australia, yet their legal character defies easy classification.
Formally, they are ad hoc administrative bodies constituted by the
executive branch of government to investigate matters of public concern
or controversy. Their conclusions are not binding in a legal sense, although
public inquiries may be armed by general statutes with a range of coercive
powers, including the power to compel the testimony of witnesses, and
may engender significant consequences for individuals, such as damage
to their reputations, the loss of livelihood, or the instigation of civil or
criminal proceedings against them. The very term "public inquiry" is
something of a moving target, and can denote processes ranging from a
straightforward departmental investigation to a complex, free-standing
institutional body with its own budget, staff, terms of reference, and
methodology for gathering and assessing evidence. Inquiries of the latter
sort tend to draw heavily from the legal profession, as active or former
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judges are frequently their heads, and public hearings in which testimony
is led and cross-examined by lawyers their most visible feature.1
Despite this affinity between public inquiries and the legal profession,
legal and academic authorities often stress a categorical distinction
between inquiries and the procedures and methods of courts. Commenting
on Australia's recent establishment of a federal public inquiry (or royal
commission) into institutional responses to child sexual abuse, Scott
Prasser remarks,
a royal commission is not a "judicial inquiry". There is no such thing in
our system of government. There are courts separated from executive
government and presided over by judges and magistrates to hear
cases based on law. By contrast, royal commissions, although often
carried out by current or former judges, are not courts of law. They are
appointed by executive government, report to executive government,
and are instruments of executive government. Executive government
decides their tens of reference, timeframes and resources. So a royal
commission is not about making judgments, but about clarifying the
facts and making recommendations on a broad range of issues.2
1. The Law Reform Commission of Canada's 1979 report on public inquiries offered a
classificatory distinction between inquiries that are "investigative" and those that are "advisory,"
and recommended that Canada's Inquiries Act, RSC 1985, c 1-11 be amended to confer separate
powers on each (see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report 13: Advisory and Investigatory
Commissions (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1979) at 3). A similar approach was
more recently advocated by The Australian Law Reform Commission in its 2009 report on the Royal
Commissions Act 1902, albeit in a form that would create more than one tier of inquiry possessing
the statutory power to compel witnesses (see Austl Commonwealth, Law Reform Commission,
Making Inquiries: A New Statutory Framework (Sydney: Australian Law Reform Commission, 2009)
at 96). Yet a neat distinction between advisory and investigative inquiries belies the fact that many
(and perhaps most) public inquiries pursue these functions simultaneously: they investigate "what
happened" in respect of a public controversy and advise the executive on policy reforms that flow
from investigative conclusions. The task of classifying public inquiries is further complicated by the
fact that in both Canada and Australia, in addition to statutory inquiries, the executive may establish
public inquiries as a matter of crown prerogative, although these inquiries do not have the power to
conscript witnesses or evidence (see Law Reform Commission, ibid at para 3.2 and Ed Ratushny,
The Conduct of Public Inquiries: Law, Policy, and Practice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) at 24-25).
Both countries also use a variety of terminology-"public inquiry," "commission of inquiry," "royal
commission," 'judicial inquiry"-to denote various inquiry processes, sometimes interchangeably,
sometimes implying important substantive differences. At the risk of imprecision, I use "public
inquiry" in this paper to denote a process that resonates most with popular understanding: that of an
ad hoc institution independent from the political branches of government, constituted to investigate a
subject of public concern, using coercive powers and public hearings that involve the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses by lawyers, and typically presided over by an active or former judge.
For a considered definition of public inquiries from a political science perspective, see Scott Prasser,
Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries in Australia (Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths,
2006) at 15, Fig 2.1.
2. Scott Prasser, "Royal commission must not be turned into a witch-hunt" The Australian (13
November 2012), online: The Australian <www.theaustraliaracom.au>.
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This view is echoed in Canada by Simon Ruel in his text, The Law of
Public Inquiries in Canada:
On the nature of the decision and the decision-making process, despite
some similarities with the judicial process, commissions of inquiry
cannot be equated with trials. They are inquisitorial, not adversarial, and
their reports and recommendations are entirely different from judicial
decisions, having no legal consequences and not being binding in any
way. Those considerations suggest a lower duty of procedural fairness.3
Indeed, the distinction between public inquiries and adversarial litigation
is central to much of the Canadian jurisprudence defining the rights of
inquiry witnesses, appropriate standards of due process, evidentiary
principles, and the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms4 to inquiry proceedings.5 As put by Utoumeau JA of the Federal
Court of Appeal,
There is a world of difference in terms of significant impacts between a
commission of inquiry and an adjudicative tribunal....
By definition, commissions of inquiry investigate rather than adjudicate. It
must not be forgotten that the commissioners chairing such commissions
do not have evidence establishing the facts, causes and circumstances of
the events being investigated. It is the very role of commissioners to seek
out that evidence and then analyze it.
Good investigators, just like fine bloodhounds, are driven by suspicions
which they seek to confirm so that the file can be closed, or to dispel so
that the search can pursue other tracks.6
The characterization of public inquiries as non-judicial may differ from
the popular impression they convey, prompted no doubt by the familiar
imagery of witnesses being cross-examined in public hearings, that such
inquiries decide questions of guilt or innocence. In the court of public
opinion at least, the distinction between legally enforceable findings of
criminal or civil liability and mere factual findings of misconduct-so
central to the jurisprudence delimiting the powers of public inquiries-
3. Simon Ruel, The Law of Public Inquiries in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 133.
4. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
[Charter].
5. See, e.g., Canada (AG) v Canada (Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System), [1997] 3 SCR
440 [Krever], concerning the scope of witness rights to notice of possible findings of misconduct,
and the prohibition against inquiries reaching findings of civil or criminal wrong; and Phillips v Nova
Scotia (Westray Mine Inquiry), [1995] 2 SCR 97 (per Cory J, concurring), concerning the application
of ss 7 and 11(d) of the Charter to inquiry proceedings.
6. Gagliano v Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising
Activities), 2011 FCA217 at paras 20-22, 336 DLR (4th) 216.
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may be illusory. It may also be illusory to inquiry participants themselves,
both individuals who seek standing at an inquiry so that an alleged injustice
against them may be redressed, and those who fall within the scrutiny of
a public inquiry, who are no doubt keenly aware of the serious personal
consequences this may entail.
The distinction between public inquiries and the adjudicative medium
of judges raises an important prudential question: is it appropriate that
judges be used to conduct public inquiries in the first place? More
specifically, is judicial leadership of inquiries an appropriate role under the
constitutional separation of powers, and does that leadership contribute
meaningfully to the underlying purposes that inquiries are intended to
serve? Both Canada and Australia would benefit from clearer guidance
concerning the use ofjudges as inquiry commissioners, and a comparison
of their respective approaches and experiences would help further this
objective.
In this paper I attempt such a comparison. I begin by introducing the
Australian doctrine of incompatibility, which subjects all extra-judicial
activities of judges to the requirement that they cohere with the overall
integrity of the judiciary. This doctrine, which Canada lacks due to its
more relaxed observance of the separation of powers, helps illuminate
purposive constitutional values relevant to the service of judges as
inquiry commissioners in both countries. The doctrine of incompatibility
does not, however, resolve some of the most challenging dilemmas that
confront judges in the conduct of public inquiries, exposing them to subtle
interference with their independence and inflicting possible unfairness
on participants. To resolve these tensions, it is necessary to more closely
reconcile the work of judges as inquiry commissioners with judicial
methods and procedures. This can be achieved by clarifying the distinct
social value generated by adjudication, and considering the extent to
which it is relevant to the work of public inquiries.
Put simply, the thesis advocated in this paper is that judges are suited
to serve on those public inquiries that demand reproduction of the basic
value of adjudication. This value can be expressed as the opportunity for
participants to be treated with structural equality, for them to receive the
opportunity to influence the outcome of a proceeding by presenting proofs
and reasoned arguments to a neutral arbiter, thus instilling a high level
of confidence in the justice of that official's decision-making. Not all
public inquiries demand the enforcement of this value, and for those that
do not the service of judges as inquiry commissioners may contribute to
an improper judicialization of proceedings and weaken their substantive
outcome. Many public inquiries do, however, demand adjudication-not
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exclusively, but to an extent appropriate to assure procedural fairness.
Recognizing this requires subverting the accepted wisdom that public
inquiries are non-adjudicative, and thus not beholden to many of the
procedural and substantive commitments of courts. Some public inquiries
are adjudicative, albeit in contexts where adjudication is blended with
other procedural forms. The key is to distinguish one type of inquiry
from the other, and thereby discern the proper forms and limits of judicial
service within them.
I. The separation ofpowers and the assumption of extra-judicial
functions by judges
In Canadajudges are used prolifically to conductpublic inquiries. Anecdotal
evidence alone bears out this trend. Quebec's Commission Charbonneau
into collusion and corruption in the provincial construction industry has
been led by a judge of the Superior Court.7 The recently completed Cohen
Commission into the decline of sockeye salmon in British Columbia's
Fraser River was similarly led by a provincial Supreme Court judge.' The
Oliphant Commission into business dealings between Karlheinz Schreiber
and former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney,9 the Gomery
Inquiry into the sponsorship scandal,1" the Cornwall Inquiry into child
sexual abuse, I x and the Walkerton Inquiry into e-coli contamination of a
regional water supply12 each drew from the bench to staff their respective
commissioner's roles. The list is further expanded if one is to include
former or retired judges. Wally Oppal, a former judge of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, recently completed that province's Missing
7. Quebec, La Commission d'enquete sur /'octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans /'industrie
de la construction, online: <www.ceic.gouv.qc.ca'la-commission.html> (Commissioner: the
Honourable France Charbonneau).
8. Canada, Privy Council, Commission of Inquiry into the Decline of Sockeye Salmon in the Fraser
River, Final Report (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2012) (Commissioner:
the Honourable Bruce I Cohen).
9. Canada, Oliphant Commission, Commission of Inquiry into Certain Allegations Concerning
Business and Financial Dealings Between Karlheinz Schreiber and the Right Honourable
Brian Mulroney, Final Report (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2010)
(Commissioner: the Honourable Jeffrey J Oliphant).
10. Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities,
Phase I and Phase 2 Reports (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005-2006)
(Commissioner: the Honourable John Gomery).
11. Ontario, Report of the Cornwall Inquiry (Ontario: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2009)
(Commissioner: the Honourable Normand C Glaude).
12. Ontario, Walkerton Commission of Inquiry Reports (Ontario: Ministry of the Attorney General,
2002) (Commissioner: the Honourable Dennis O'Connor).
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Women Commission of Inquiry.13 John Major, a retired justice of Canada's
Supreme Court, completed the Air India Inquiry in 2010.14 Ontario's Elliot
Lake Inquiry into the fatal collapse of a shopping mall was conducted by
Paul R Blanger, a former judge of the Ontario Court of Justice.15
In Australia, too, judicial leadership of public inquiries is not
uncommon, although the appointment of active judges to this role is more
restrained.16 No doubt this is due in part to the relatively strict separation
of powers imposed by Australia's federal Constitution, and to consequent
restrictions on the assumption of extra-judicial offices by serving judges.
In this Part, I explain the Australian approach to this issue. Although
focusing for the moment on Australia, my intention is to underscore a
basic constitutional dimension to the question of whether judges should
serve as inquiry commissioners, one that I argue is relevant in Canada too
despite its gentler approach to the separation of powers.
1. The separation ofpowers in Australia
The Australian judiciary is composed of both federal and state courts, each
appointed by their respective levels of government and responsible for the
13. British Columbia, Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, Forsaken: The Report of the Missing
Women Commission of Inquiry (British Columbia: Ministoy of Justice, 2012) (Commissioner: the
Honourable Wally Oppal) [MWCI].
14. Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182,
Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada,
2010) (Commissioner: the Honourable John C Major).
15. Ontario, Elliot Lake Inquiry, Report of the Elliot Lake Commission of Inquiry (Ontario: Queens
Printer for Ontario, 2014), online: The ElliotLake Inquiry <www.elliotlakeinquiry.ca> (Commissioner:
the Honourable Paul R Belanger).
16. The state bench of Victoria prohibits the service of its members as inquiry commissioners, a
practice dating back to a 1931 letter from then Chief Justice Irvine of the state Supreme Court to
the Attorney General. The so-called "Irvine Memorandum" is considered in detail in Sir Murray
McInerney et al, Judges as Royal Commissioners and Chairmen of Non-Judicial Tribunals (Canberra:
Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 1986) at 11 and 17-18. Enid Campbell and HP Lee
suggest that a similar position has long been taken by judges of the High Court, and that most state
benches view service on commissions of inquiry as warranted only in "exceptional" circumstances:
see Enid Campbell & HP Lee, The Australian Judiciary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001) at 171. Nevertheless, the Australian Law Reform Commission has observed that most modern
public inquiries appointed under the Royal CommissionsAct 1902 have been chaired eitherby ajudge,
a retired judge or prominent lawyer (Law Reform Commission, supra note 1 at 68), and that the New
South Wales and Australian Capital Territory statutes governing public inquiries provide that certain
powers may only be exercised when a commissioner is a judge or lawyer (ibid at 80). Debate about
the propriety of Australian judges serving as inquiry commissioners abounds: see, e.g., the Hon DG
McGregor, QC, "The Case For," in McInerney et al, ibid; Sir Murray McInerney, "The Appointment
of Judges to Commissions of Inquiry and Other Extra-Judicial Activities" (1978) 52 Austl LJ 540;
Tom Sherman, "Should judges conduct royal commissions?" (1997) 8 Pub L Rev 5; and George
Winterton, "Judges as Royal Commissioners" (1987) 10 UNSWLJ 108. Geoffrey Lindell provides
an excellent overview of constitutional and other issues surrounding the appointment of judges as
inquiry commissioners in Tribunals of Inquiry and Royal Commissions (Law and Policy Paper 22)
(Annandale, NSW: The Federation Press, 2002) at 5-13, comparing practices in Britain and Australia.
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resolution of legal disputes within their respective areas of jurisdiction.
A formal separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government exists only under Australia's federal,
Commonwealth Constitution, and consequently the case law delimiting
restrictions on the extra-judicial functions of judges pertains mainly to
judges of federally appointed courts. There is scope for the application of
these restrictions to state courts, however, to the extent that such courts
may be delegated authority to enforce federal laws and thus form part of
an integrated, federal system ofjustice.
Formally, the powers and limits of Australia's federal judiciary are
drawn from Chapter III of the Constitution. Section 71 provides that
"The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a federal
Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such
other federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as
it invests with federal jurisdiction.1 7 As Cheryl Saunders explains, s. 71
has been interpreted by the courts to be both exclusive and exhaustive;
that is, "only the courts listed in section 71 may exercise federal judicial
power"1 8 and "federal courts may not exercise any other types of power." 9
These principles have been applied strictly. The High Court held in the
landmark 1956 Boilermakers 'Case: "A federal constitution must be rigid.
The government it establishes must be one of defined powers; within those
powers it must be paramount, but it must be incompetent to go beyond
them."2 Accordingly, many functions that are routinely exercised by the
Canadian judiciary would be considered constitutionally impermissible in
Australia. For example, the provision of judicial reference opinions has
been found in Australia to violate the separation of powers, as it engages
the judiciary in providing "advice" ratherthan adjudicating legal disputes.2"
A longstanding exception to Australia's strict separation of powers is
that judges acting in a personal capacity-as personae designatae-may
assume extra-judicial functions that vest in them as individuals rather than
as judges. An illustrative example is the use of judges to authorize certain
investigative techniques employed by the police, such as wiretaps. These
authorizations, which are common, core duties of Canada's criminal bench,
and which take place within the physical offices of the judiciary even in
17. Australian Constitution (Cth), s 71.
18. Cheryl Saunders, The Australian Constitution (Carlton, Vic: Constitutional Centenary
Foundation, 1997) at 76.
19. Ibid. See also Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd & Meakes v Dignan
(1931) 46 CLR 73 (HCA).
20. R v Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia, (1956), 94 CLR 254 (HCA)
[Boilermakers'Case].
21. In Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257 (HCA).
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Australia, are nevertheless considered there to be personal, administrative
functions of judges as opposed to judicial functions of courts. The notion
of such persona designata appointments has only limited application in
Canada. In Canada (Minister ofIndian Affairs and Northern Development)
v Ranville, Dickson J (as he then was) straightforwardly declared that
"whenever a statutory power is conferred on a s. 96 judge or officer of a
court the power should be deemed exercisable in an official capacity as
representing the court, unless there is express provision to the contrary.1
22
The same principle would appear to apply to Canada's provincially-
appointed j udiciary. 23 Accordingly, the conferral of new authority onjudges
in Canada will be assumed to vest in them qua judges, absent express
intention to the contrary; in fact, the service of judges on commissions
of inquiry is among the most visible instances in which such an intention
is clear.24 Even in that context, few Canadian scholars would use the
term "persona designata" to refer such appointments, and the concept
receives scant attention in Canadian texts on constitutional law. The fact
that it is retained in Australia is significant, not simply because of formal
differences between how Australians and Canadians define "judicial"
functions, but because it draws specific attention to separation of powers
concerns that arise in the conferral of new roles on judges. Those concerns
find expression in an important caveat to the persona designata exception:
the so-called doctrine of incompatibility.
The incompatibility doctrine is intended to ensure that when judges do
assume extra-judicial duties, their conduct will not impugn the integrity
and proper operation of the judiciary as a whole.2 1 In Grollo v. Palmer,2 6
Australia's High Court found that incompatibility arises under the
following three circumstances: (1) where a judge assumes "so permanent
22. [1982] 2 SCR 518 at 527 [Ranville].
23. See, e.g., Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Co Ltd v the Honourable Judge RG Cummings,
2004 MBCA 182, 247 DLR (4th) 554, per Freedman JA at para 18: "[t]he principle that persona
designata applies in a case only if the statute expressly so states has, in my opinion, equal application
to provincially appointed judges."
24. See the Federal Court's decision in Canada (AG) v Canada (Commission of the Inquiry on the
Blood System), [1997] 2 FCR 36, where the court affirms that judicial commissioners are persona
designata appointees. Extra-judicial service by Canada's federally-appointed judges is governed by
the JudgesAct, RSC 1985, c J-1, s 56(1); its requirement for express statutory authorization reinforces
the principle from Ranville. Several examples of Canadian extra-judicial appointments are provided
by Patrick Monahan & Byron Shaw, "The impact of extra-judicial service on the Canadian judiciary:
the need for reform" in HP Lee, ed, Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011) 428. These include service as inquiry commissioners, on electoral boundary
commissions, on advisory councils for the Order of Canada, and on several administrative tribunals:
see ibid at 436-438.
25. See Hilton v Wells, [1985] 157 CLR 57 at 73 (HCA).
26. [1995] 184 CLR 348 (HCA).
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and complete" a commitment to a non-judicial function that his or her
judicial duties are disrupted, (2) where the nature of the non-judicial
function is such that the judge's ability to perform his or her judicial duties
with the requisite integrity is impaired, and (3) where the non-judicial
function is "of such a nature that public confidence in the integrity of
the judiciary as an institution or in the capacity of the individual Judge
to perform his or her judicial functions with integrity is diminished. 27
The Court also added that the assumption of extra-judicial duties must
be voluntary, meaning a judge cannot be required to assume them under
statute or by administrative direction.28
The incompatibility doctrine was further refined in Wilson v. Minister
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Afjairs,2 in which Brennan CJ
set out an analytic test to determine the conformity of an extra-judicial
appointment with the third branch of Grollo-that is, with preserving
public confidence in the judiciary. The courts will ask:
(1) Is the function "an integral part of, or.. closely connected [to], the
functions of the Legislature or Executive government?"3 If the
answer is "no," then no prima facie incompatibility arises.
(2) Is the function "required to be performed independently of any
instruction, advice or wish of the Legislature or the Executive
Government, other than a law or instrument made under a law[?] "II
If the answer to this question is "yes," then the inquiry proceeds to
the third step. If the answer is "no," then an immediate finding of
incompatibility results.
(3) Finally, "Is any discretion purportedly possessed by the Ch III
judge to be exercised on political grounds-that is, on grounds
that are not confined by factors expressly or impliedly prescribed
by law?" 32 An affirmative answer to this question will result in a
finding of incompatibility. A function that clears this final hurdle,
however, may constitutionally be exercised by a Ch III judge.
Wilson concerned the appointment of a Federal Court judge under
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1994
to investigate the potential impact of a bridge development on Aboriginal
heritage interests in Hindmarsh Island, a region of South Australia, and to
provide an advisory report to the responsible minister. The High Court held
27. Ibid at 365.
28. Ibid.
29. [1996] 189 CLR 1 (HCA) [Wilson].
30. Ibid at 17.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
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that this appointment failed to accord with the incompatibility doctrine
and thus violated Chapter III of the Constitution. The Court characterized
the appointee's extra-judicial function as a "condition precedent" to the
exercise of political discretion by the Minister. It was not an institutionally
independent appointment because the Minister could intervene at any
time to direct or interfere with the appointee's discretion. Importantly, the
High Court in Wilson also drew a strong connection between procedural
fairness and the separation of powers-and, in particular, preserving the
independence of the judiciary. The Court held that although presence of
procedural fairness alone was not conclusive of compatibility with Ch III,
its absence is fatal: "if a judicial manner of performance is not required,
it is unlikely that the performance... will be performed free of political
interference or without the prospect of exercising political discretion."33
It will be recalled that Chapter III of the Australian Constitution
concerns only the federal judiciary. A 2011 decision of the High Court
appears nevertheless to extend the incompatibility doctrine to the extra-
judicial activities of state court judges.3 4 The Court's reasoning is based
on the authority of the Commonwealth government to vest federal judicial
power in the state judiciary. The mere possibility of this vesting requires
an integrated approach to the separation of powers in order to maintain
constitutional integrity and coherence. As Rebecca Welsh has observed,
this may cement a "uniform notion of incompatibility rising, capable of
providing a standard of constitutional protection for the independence and
integrity of the nation's entire judicial structure.""
The merit of these developments has been debated by Australian
jurists. Critics suggest that the incompatibility doctrine biases courts in
favour of validating extra-judicial tasks: since it demands the case-by-case
assessment of appointments, strong policy arguments justifying the extra-
judicial service of judges in individual cases are likely to trump concern
for the gradual erosion of the separation of powers, which may only be
observable over time.36 Proponents argue that the doctrine better reflects
and enforces the underlying values of the separation of powers, obviating
33. Ibid.
34. Wanohu v New South Wales, (2011) 85 ALJR 746 (HCA).
35. Rebecca Welsh, "Incompatibility Rising? Some Potential Consequences of Wainohu v New
South Wales" (2011) 22:4 Pub L Rev 251 at 263.
36. See, e.g., Kristen Walker, "Persona Designata, Incompatibility and the Separation of Powers"
(1997) 8 Pub L Rev 153 at 167; Denise Meyerson, "Judicial Independence in Australia and South
Africa: Comparative Lessons" (2007) Macquarie Law Working Paper Series, WP 2007-9 at 10
[Meyerson, "Judicial Independence"]; and Denise Meyerson, "Extra-Judicial Service on the Part of
Judges: Constitutional Impediments in Australia and South Africa" (2003) 3 OUCLJ 181.
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the need for inflexible formalism.37 Sir Anthony Mason has taken such a
view in arguing that
the concept [of persona designata] has little to commend it. Rationality
would be advanced if the concept were jettisoned and replaced by the
incompatibility test .... It is a matter of identifying the purpose or purposes
intended to be served by the separation ofjudicial power, particularly for
executive power. Once this is done 'incompatibility' has a natural place
in the scheme of things.38
For present purposes, it is not necessary to resolve this debate. The
value of considering Australia's incompatibility doctrine lies in the light
it sheds on matters of constitutional principle that arise when judges face
appointment to an unorthodox task. Regardless of formal differences in
their constitutions, these principles are relevant in both Australia and
Canada. Specifically, the analytic steps enforced by the incompatibility
doctrine bring the following principles into relief:
The separation of powers is purposive. The third branch of
Grollo draws a connection between respect for the separation
of powers and public confidence in the judiciary. The test from
Wilson elaborates this concept, indicating that confidence in the
judiciary involves preservation of independence, even where the
judge assumes a non-judicial duty. The independence principle
embraces freedom from outside interference or political direction
in the exercise of such a judge's discretion.
Judicial independence is not the only value protected by the
separation of powers. Wilson provides that a persona designata
judge not exercise discretion on "political grounds," or those not
"expressly or impliedly prescribed by law." While the exclusion
of judges from political decisions intrinsically reinforces
independence, it also honours the correlative principles of
representative and responsible government 39: that political
decision-making be confined to officials accountable to an elected
legislature and thus to the citizenry. As noted elsewhere in the
37. See especially Fiona Wheeler, "The Use of Judges to Discharge Executive Functions: The Justice
Matthews Case" (1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 10; Fiona Wheeler, "The Rise
and Rise of Judicial Power under Chapter III of the Constitution: A Decade in Overview" (2001)
20 Austl Bar Rev 283 at 288-289; and Fiona Wheeler, "The Separation of Federal Judicial Power:
A Purposive Analysis" (PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1999) at 157, online: Australian
National University <http://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au>
38. Sir Anthony Mason, "A New Perspective on Separation of Powers" (1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin
of Public Administration I at 5.
39. See, e.g., James Stellios, "Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power" (2011) 22 Pub L Rev
113 at 134.
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Wilson decision, the appointment of a persona designata judge
should not be used to "cloak" controversial political deliberation
with the symbolic independence of the judiciary.40
Finally, preservation of the separation of powers is intimately
linked to procedure. At minimum, the persona designata judge
must honourthe requirements ofprocedural fairness (or, in Wilson's
words, behave 'judicially"). Procedural fairness is obviously
intended to protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of
power. By making it a necessary feature of compatibility with the
separation of powers, however, Wilson underscores the role played
by due process in intrinsically reinforcing judicial independence
and the insulation ofjudges from political decision-making.
Patrick Monahan and Byron Shaw have argued that Canada requires
stronger governance of the extra-judicial activities of judges.41 Placing
emphasis on problematic examples of judge-led inquiries-such as the
Somalia Inquiry,42 which was prematurely terminated following aprotracted
conflict between its commissioners and the government concerning
document production and extensions to its reporting deadlines-the
authors suggest "that governments have far too frequently capitalized on
the credibility and authority of the judicial office at the expense of public
confidence in the judiciary.143 This confidence is weakened when extra-
judicial tasks force judges into politicized roles, cast them as adversaries
to the government or as advocates for particular causes, expose them to
allegations of unfairness, or make their decisions subject to review by
their judicial colleagues.44 Although Monahan and Shaw advocate the
prohibition of judges serving as inquiry commissioners, they argue that
at minimum stronger guidelines are required to steer judges away from
problematic assignments.
The Australian guidelines on incompatibility may help to fill this gap.
They are especially valuable in drawing an explicit connection between
the professional boundaries of judges and purposive values embodied
in the separation of powers; that is, in making respect for those values a
central tenet ofjudicial ethics. However, it is not clear that they address the
40. See Wilson, supra note 29 at para 7, citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361 (1989).
41. Monahan & Shaw, supra note 24.
42. Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia,
Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and
Government Services, 1997) (Chair: the Honourable Gilles Letourneau).
43. Monahan & Shaw, supra note 24 at 428-429.
44. Ibidat 439-445.
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dilemmas that may confront judges in the conduct of inquiries, threatening
constitutional values even where the incompatibility criteria are satisfied.
In the next section, I consider some of these dilemmas in detail, and
suggest the need for a clearer analytic test to guide the conduct of judicial
commissioners in both jurisdictions.
II. Dilemmas confronting inquiry commissioners
It is relatively straightforward to imagine inquiry terms of reference that
would violate Australia's doctrine of incompatibility. Terms that stipulate
that an inquiry commissioner heed direction from the executive in focusing
his or her investigation, for example, would clearly lack the requisite
quality of independence. So too would terms that contain an obvious
defect in procedural fairness-for example, by directing a commissioner
to opine on the alleged misconduct of an individual without providing
that person an opportunity to be heard. Yet these obvious examples
belie the complexity of dilemmas that commissioners face in the actual
execution of inquiries, many of which fall into grey areas left unresolved
by the incompatibility criteria. For example, at what point does the work
of a commission become too "closely connected" to political questions,
and thus call the original validity of its appointment into doubt? Is a
commissioner's discretion properly "governed by law" if the appointing
government duly enacts terms of reference that fetter the commissioner's
discretion in subtle ways-for example, by limiting the commissioner's
ability to accord standing to interested parties?
The aim of this section is to present these more subtle and challenging
cases using practical examples drawn from public inquiries in both
Australia and Canada. In each case, the incompatibility concerns raised
by the examples are framed as dilemmas confronting the judge as inquiry
commissioner. It should be acknowledged that, in a general sense,
these dilemmas are not unique to judicial commissioners; they may be
confronted by any individual serving as the head of a public inquiry.
They nevertheless pose distinct challenges for the judicial commissioner
because they conflict with the adjudicative methodology in which he or
she has been inculcated and raise the special concern that failure to resolve
them effectively could adversely affect public confidence in the judiciary.
The examples considered here include both active and former judges
serving as inquiry commissioners. Australia's incompatibility doctrine is
applicable only to serving judges, and for this reason several commentators
have argued that formerjudges should be favoured for inquiry appointments,
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thus circumventing concerns over the separation of powers .4 In my view,
however, the dilemmas considered in this section should be as concerning
for formerjudges as they are for those still serving on the bench. Advocates
for the use of former judges base their arguments on the assumption that
these individuals embody the same qualities and skills as their active
counterparts. This includes extensive experience scrutinizing evidence
and testimony. Crucially, it also includes the impression of independence,
fairness, and impartiality associated with judicial office-values necessary
to instil confidence in the inquiry process. 46 If former judges are appointed
for the same underlying reasons as serving ones, then one would expect
them to observe the same standards of conduct. Moreover, one would
expect the same symbolism, and the same vesting of public confidence,
to attach to a former judge as it does to a serving judge. This being the
the case, the notion that former judges can avoid the unique challenges
raised by judicial leadership of an inquiry is illusory. Perceived inefficacy
or unfairness on the part of a former judge will be just as disappointing
to participants and observers whose expectations were informed by the
symbolism of a judicial appointee. Consequently, the same damage is
likely to be inflicted on public esteem in the judiciary. The dilemmas raised
by judicial leadership of an inquiry, and the ethical imperative to resolve
them in a way that preserves confidence in the judiciary, pertain whenever
judicial symbolism and values are intentionally evoked in service of an
inquiry. It matters not that the commissioner's judicial status may be
"former" rather than "current."
I group the dilemmas confronting judicial commissioners in two broad
categories according to the underlying tensions they raise: the first between
ajudicial commissioner's independence and the inherently political nature
of public inquiries, and the second between a commissioner's fidelity to
procedural fairness and the investigative character of inquiries. Both types
of dilemma help to illuminate the limits and potential of judges as inquiry
commissioners, a matter explored more fully below.
1. Judicial independence and the political character of inquiries
In both Canada and Australia, public inquiries are instigated at the
discretion of the executive branch of government under the authority
of general empowering statutes. It is trite to point out that political
considerations weigh on the constitution of new public inquiries. These
considerations may shape important decisions concerning an inquiry's
45. See, e.g., Meyerson, "Judicial Independence," supra note 36 and Winterton, supra note 16.
46. See Ruel, supra note 3 at 13-14.
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mandate, including whether the appointing government will allow itself
to fall under the inquiry's investigative lens. Less obvious factors, too,
will be affected by politics, such as the budget and reporting deadline of
an inquiry. The overall character of an inquiry will be determined in large
part by whether the constituting government intends it to be a robust and
thorough investigation into a pressing issue, a brief, calculated public
relations exercise intended to quell controversy, or something in between.4"
When judges accept appointment as inquiry commissioners, they thus
step into a forum heavily affected by politics. Assuming that judges may
nevertheless protect their personal independence and the integrity of the
judiciary when executing an inquiry commission, the key is to ascertain
in which instances political influences may be taken too far. The examples
below are intended to illustrate the difficulty of establishing this boundary.
On 5 May 1994 the High Court of Australia handed down its decision
in New South Wales v. Canellis,48 a case concerning the rights of witnesses
compelled to appear before public inquiries. The inquiry in Canellis had
been appointed under the Crimes Act49 to review the conviction of Andrew
Kalajzich for the murder of his wife. The circumstances surrounding the
murder had provoked a public scandal and received widespread media
coverage. Kalajzich consistently maintained his innocence and alleged
that his prosecution was orchestrated by members of Sydney's criminal
underworld. The Crimes Act, while not a general public inquiries statute,
allowed for the appointment of ad hoc investigative bodies to review
criminal convictions, empowering those bodies with similar authority
to compel witnesses, testimony, and evidence as in the context of a
royal commission. Such an inquiry was appointed to review Kalajzich's
conviction, with John Patrick Slattery, a former judge of the Supreme
Court of New South Wales, appointed its Commissioner.
The applicants in Canellis were two witnesses summoned to testify
during the public hearings of the inquiry. Both had appeared as witnesses
at Kalajzich's trial and given key evidence leading to his conviction. In
Kalajzich's account, however, both were co-conspirators responsible for
the murder of his wife and for perverting the course ofjustice." Kalajzich's
claim of wrongful conviction thus rested entirely on imputing criminal
responsibility to the two witnesses. Should Commissioner Slattery conclude
that Kalajzich had been wrongly convicted, the necessary implication
47. Ed Ratushny astutely observes: "It seems contradictory to describe commissions of inquiry as
beingbotha 'check onpolitics' and a 'political tool'but both aspects are a reality" (supra note 1 at 20).
48. [1994] 181 CLR 309 (HCA) [Canellis (HCA)].
49. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) [Crimes Act].
50. Canellis (HCA), supra note 48 at para 15.
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would be that the other two witnesses were responsible and had perjured
themselves during Kalajzich's trial. The inquiry thus engendered serious
personal risks for both individuals.
The circumstances in Canellis were further complicated by the fact
that both witnesses were indigent. Neither could afford to retain counsel
and both were denied support from the state legal aid authority, whose
mandate did not include assisting those summoned before commissions of
inquiry. All other key witnesses at the inquiry, including Kalajzich, were
fully represented by counsel financed by public funds. Following the denial
of legal aid funding, one of the witnesses applied to the Commissioner for
relief, seeking a stay of the inquiry until such time as appropriate legal
funding could be attained. Commissioner Slattery was sympathetic to
the applicant's position, acknowledging that the conduct of the inquiry
would benefit from the parties being legally represented. 1 In addition
to the obvious obstacles that self-representation posed to the witnesses
meaningfully defending their interests, they were practically impeded
from reviewing the evidence: all material considered by the inquiry was
transmitted electronically, requiring specialized training and computer
skills that the applicants lacked. Only counsel (and not inquiry witnesses
themselves) were allowed access to begin with. Moreover, none of the
represented witnesses shared a common interest with the applicants that
could have sustained advocacy on their behalf Despite these obstacles,
however, the Commissioner found that he did not have authority to
order either the state or the legal aid commission to provide funding to
the applicants, and that a stay of the inquiry would be improper.52 This
prompted the parties to seek judicial review.
The applicants were unsuccessful at first instance but succeeded before
the New South Wales Court of Appeal. Kirby P, as he then was, found
that the denial of counsel in the circumstances violated natural justice,
as the parties were thereby deprived of the opportunity to be heard fully
and impartially. 3 Since Parliament could not have intended this result,
it followed that to proceed with the inquiry absent representation for the
witnesses constituted an excess of the Commissioner's jurisdiction. The
court declined to order that state funding be provided to the applicants, but
51. The Commissioner's comments in this respect were noted by the New South Wales Court of
Appeal in Canellis v Slattery, [1994] 33 NSWLR 104 [Canellis (CA)]. Kirby P observed: "Earlier, the
Commissioner had said, in respect of eachof the appellants, that he believed they should be represented
'and represented adequately.' Indeed, he had assumed that those representing the appellants 'would be
compensated' for their fees 'in some way."' Ibid at 116.
52. See Canellis (CA), ibid at 116.
53. Ibidat 124.
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declared that continuation ofthe inquiry without proper legal representation
was prohibited at common law. 4
The High Court overturned the Court of Appeal's findings. While
procedural fairness commanded a common law right to counsel in serious
criminal trials, this right did not extend to inquiry proceedings.5 Rather,
the applicants' due process concerns were characterized as predominantly
reputational, and capable of accommodation within the inquiry's existing
statutory and procedural framework. 6 Moreover, the Court found that
the Commissioner had no power to issue an adjournment or stay of
proceedings, as such a power was not conferred by the governing statute:
[A] Commissioner acting under s. 475 [of the CrimesAct] does notpossess
express or inherent power to grant a stay. Certainly there is no express
power in the section .... The Commissioner is directed... to transmit to the
Governor, 'as soon as shall be practicable' every deposition taken under
the section 'together with his report as to the conclusions to be drawn
therefrom'. No other option is available to the Commissioner.
The rules of procedural fairness cannot compel a decision-maker to do
what he or she lacks power to do.
57
These reasons are striking: they suggest that even had the Commissioner
considered it necessary that the witnesses receive legal representation as a
matter of procedural fairness, he would not only lack authority to enforce
that decision, he would also be obliged to proceed with the inquiry despite
the perceived unfairness.
Canellis illustrates a subtle, but nonetheless significant, constraint that
may be imposed on a commissioner's discretion. The Commissioner felt
that the applicants should be represented by counsel. It was assumed, and
not contested even in the High Court's decision, that the applicants' due
process rights included the opportunity to scrutinize evidence and possibly
to cross-examine other witnesses. As such, the argument favouring their
representation was notjust one of fairness but one of efficiency: rather than
contend with the procedural challenges of accommodating unrepresented
individuals, the Commissioner would have preferred that their participation
be channelled through the professional advice and discretion of counsel.
This would also likely have enriched the quality of the Commissioner's
investigation, enabling him to hear full argumentation as to the veracity
54. Ibid at 126.
55. Canellis (HCA), supra note 48 at para 35.
56. Ibid at paras 37, 40.
57. Ibidat paras 32, 38.
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of key facts. However, the Commissioner's empowering statutes-both
the Crimes Act and the order-in-council appointing his inquiry-did not
enable him to secure funding for the legal representation of witnesses.
Funding was a political decision, and the Commissioner was obliged to
carry out his mandate within the parameters set by the executive branch
of government.
The political decision to provide funding to some, but not all, witnesses
at an inquiry may not influence a commissioner's independence in the
sense of directing him toward particular conclusions. It does, however,
significantly limit his or her manner of investigation and arguably the
substantive quality of the investigative findings. Moreover, it substitutes a
political calculation forthe commissioner's own independent assessment of
what fairness requires in respect of individual witnesses. It will be recalled
that in Wilson, affording due process was equated with behaving 'judicially."
While the Court in Canellis held that representation by counsel was not
required by due process, the question remains whether a judge behaves
'judicially" in denying legal representation to witnesses whose interests
are significantly affected by a proceeding when other participants, adverse
in interest to those witnesses, are afforded the full benefit of counsel. 8 If
we were to accept the Court of Appeal's characterization that the denial
of counsel in Canellis did violate due process, then the execution of the
inquiry commission by a sitting judge would presumptively violate the
doctrine of incompatibility. Accepting the High Court's decision, we are
still forced to recognize that the independence of inquiry commissioners is
conditioned by political considerations that may disrupt a commissioner's
own sense of the most just and effective way to complete his or her inquiry.
A recent Canadian example also illustrates this point. On 19
November 2012, Commissioner Wally Oppal submitted his report for the
58. Lord Justice Salmon, in his 1966 Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, argued fervently
that inquiry witnesses were entitled to legal representation and to public compensation for legal costs
incurred (UK, Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, Report of the Commission Under the
Chairmanship ofthe Rt Hon Lord Justice Salmon (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1966) at
23-26). He wrote: "It is a great hardship that a witness should be left to bear the very heavy expenses
often incurred in being legally represented before the Tribunal. After all, the inquiry is in the public
interest, the witness is the Tribunal's witness, it is usually just that the witness should be represented,
and his solicitor or counsel are assisting the Tribunal in arriving at the truth. It is manifestly unfair that
such a witness should be left to face what in a long inquiry is often a crippling bill of costs." (ibid at
25). See also the discussion in Stephen Donaghue, Royal Commissions and Permanent Commissions
of Inquiry (Chatswood: Butterworths, 2001) at 193-194.
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Missing Women Commission ofInquiry.9 Commissioner Oppal's inquiry
had been appointed by the British Columbia government to scrutinize
police investigations carried out over a five-year period concerning the
disappearance of women from Vancouver's downtown eastside. It was
alleged by friends and family members of the women, together with several
community groups, that the disappearances had received inadequate
attention and investigative resources. Following the conviction of serial
murderer Robert Pickton in 2007 and the exhaustion of his legal appeals, the
provincial government capitulated to public pressure and commissioned an
inquiry focused on the adequacy of the police investigations. Commissioner
Oppal granted standing to a number of individuals and groups whom he
considered to have a direct and substantial interest in the subject-matter of
the inquiry. This included several community organizations who provided
frontline services to survival sex workers and drug users in Vancouver's
downtown eastside, and who thus possessed unique knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the missing women and a strong capacity to
express community experiences, perspectives, and concerns.60
The Ministry of the Attorney General, which held discretion over the
funding of inquiry participants, declined to fund legal representation for
all but one of the groups-that representing surviving family members
of Pickton's victims. This decision significantly curtailed the ability of
the groups to participate in the inquiry, which involved the review of
voluminous evidence and the ability to examine and cross-examine
relevant witnesses. Despite Commissioner Oppal's attempt to facilitate
their participation-both through a separate "Study Commission"
59. MWCI, supra note 13. Inadditionto his judicial background, Oppal is a formerAttorney General
of British Columbia, having entered politics following his retirement from the bench. The fact that he
is a former member of the government that appointed the MWCI has been the source of controversy.
As Attorney General, Oppal defended the government's decision not to call an inquiry while Robert
Pickton's legal proceedings were ongoing, as well as the decision to stay an additional 20 murder
charges against Pickton following his conviction on 6 charges. These decisions were understandably
controversial amongst family members of Pickton's victims and advocates for a public inquiry. See
generally, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association et al, Blueprint for an Inquiry: Learning
from the Failures of the Missing Women Commission of Inquiry (Vancouver: British Columbia Civil
Liberties Association, 2012) at 50-51 [BCCLA], and Kim Stanton, "Intransigent Injustice: Truth,
Reconciliation and the Missing Women Inquiry in Canada" (2013) 1:2 Transitional Justice Review 59
at 71-73.
60. The Commissioner's own reasons recognizing the special value of these participants are
contained in his Ruling on Participation and Funding Recommendations (2 May 2011), online:
Missing Women Commission of Inquiry <http://www.missingwomeninquiry.ca>.
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process, 1 involving less formal hearings which obviated the need for legal
representation, and by appointing special counsel to represent "Aboriginal
Interests" and "Downtown Eastside Interests" in the formal evidentiary
hearings62 -several of the groups opted to boycott the inquiry. By denying
them participation on equal terms with powerful organizational interests,
such as the government and police, the groups regarded the inquiry as
reproducing the societal prejudices at play in the subject-matter of the
inquiry itself.63
Commissioner Oppal was very critical of the government's decision.
In a private voicemail to the Attorney General, he complained:
[T]hese are the women who complained to the police about women
being missing and were given the back of their hands... the police gave
them the back of their hands to these women and disregarded what they
had to say. So they can't cross-examine the police, who are of course
well-armed with publicly funded lawyers....
So anyway, I just wanted you to know that, it's how important this all
is. And the government is now being seen as funding the people who
allegedly done everything wrong and ignored the women, ignored the
victims but not funding.. will not go and fund the victims, and not fund
the women, the poor aboriginal women. That's what the government is
seen as. I just want you to know that.64
The Ministry of the Attorney General, itself a party to the inquiry's
proceedings through its Criminal Justice Branch, subsequently alleged
that this message implied the pre-judgment of material issues. The
61. The appointment of the Study Commission required an amendment to the inquiry's original
terms of reference, which had conceived of the inquiry as a purely "hearings inquiry" under the
provincial Public Inquiry Act, SBC 2007, c 9 (see further discussion in text accompanying note
106). This amendment was made before the Commissioner's ruling on standing, and as such was
not a direct response to the denial of funding for certain participants. It nevertheless was intended to
facilitate a broader and less formal means of community consultation than the evidentiary hearings
process allowed. The Study Commission included community forums in British Columbia's north
and northwest; several expert roundtables; community hearings in the downtown eastside; and direct
consultations with the family members of missing and murdered women. For an overview of the Study
Commission process, see the MWCI, vol 4, supra note 13 at 24-26.
62. Commissioner Oppal explains the appointment of special counsel, ibid at 10: "Although unique
to public inquiries, these appointments were, in some ways, akin to the role of amicus curiae."
63. See, e.g., BCCLA, supra note 59 at 5 and 25-26. The authors make the stark point that the
public funds expended on legal fees for one senior commission counsel would likely have supported
legal representation for all of the excluded participant groups combined, or financed the operation of
a women's drop-in centre for a year (ibid at 26). The Commissioner himself addresses the boycott in
MWCI vol 4, ibid at 9-10.
64. Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, "Statement by Missing Women Commission of Inquiry
Commissioner Wally Oppal" (30 June 2011), online: Missing Women Commission of Inquiry <http:/
www.missingwomeninquiry.ca>.
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Commissioner was forced to disclose the contents of the voicemail and
publicly reiterate his impartiality.65
Unfortunately, these events reduced the credibility of the
Commissioner's report among the very individuals and groups whose
confidence it was intended to restore.66 A joint-statement by the Native
Women's Association of Canada and Canadian Feminist Alliance for
International Action (FAIFA) powerfully expressed their disapproval:
"The Native Women's Association of Canada was shut out of the B.C.
Missing Women Commission of Inquiry," said Sharon McIvor of FAFIA.
"The inquiry proceeded without Aboriginal women's organizations,
without any Aboriginal organizations, and without the women's
organizations who know about the lives of vulnerable women."
"This process was discriminatory, and a betrayal of Aboriginal women
and girls. Because the Government of British Columbia refused to
provide funding for legal counsel for parties granted standing at the
Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, the Inquiry itself violated the
rights of the most vulnerable women. It excluded them; it did not listen
to them; and it refused to put them on an equal footing with police and
government representatives," said McIvor.67
In his final report, Commissioner Oppal lamented that the withdrawal of the
groups diminished his access to high-quality, representative information
and perspectives from members of the downtown eastside community.
He reiterated that the denial of funding "was not in the public interest"
and presented "a significant hurdle.., and no doubt made the work of the
Commission more difficult."68
Like the inquiry in Canellis, the MWCI illustrates how politics may
affect a Commissioner's discretion in a manner that will not be readily
apparent on an inquiry's terms of reference. Commissioner Oppal wanted
the affected community groups to participate in his inquiry, both so that
they might have the dignity of being heard and so that their valuable
knowledge and perspectives could contribute to his ultimate investigative
task. His lack of authority over the legal funding of participants thus had
65. See the Commissioner's statement, ibid. It is noteworthy that the Commissioner emphasized his
judicial background in attempting to provide assurance of his impartiality: "I hope that my judicial
record, including 23 years on the County, Supreme and Appeal Court bench, demonstrates that I
understood the need not to come to any conclusion before all of the evidence and submissions have
been heard."
66. See generally BCCLA, supra note 59 and Stanton, supra note 59 at 73-79.
67. Native Women's Association of Canada, Press Release, "Native Women's Association of Canada
and Canadian Feminist Alliance for International Action Respond to Oppal by Calling for a National
Public Inquiry and a Framework for Action to End Violence," (21 January 2013), online: Native
Women's Association of Canada <http://www.nwac.ca/media/release/17-12-12>.
68. MWCI, vol 4, supra note 13 at 9-10.
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a significant and negative impact on the manner in which he saw fit to
conduct his inquiry. Indeed, it prompted many community stakeholders to
reject the authority of the inquiry before Commissioner Oppal had even
formulated his report. The decision to deny funding to the community
groups was explicitly political: the government, having initiated the
inquiry, sought to curtail its costs by limiting legal funding to those it
identified as the most crucial participants. 9 By removing this discretion
from the Commissioner, the government affected the inquiry's fairness,
the quality of its investigation, and its perceived legitimacy.
2. Due process and the investigative nature ofpublic inquiries
I noted in the Introduction that legal and academic authorities often stress
the non-adjudicative character of public inquiries, distinguishing them
from courtroom proceedings on the basis that they involve no legal dispute
between parties and that their focus is fundamentally investigative. In a
classic Canadian statement of this position, the Federal Court in Beno v.
Canada"0 affirmed:
A public inquiry is not equivalent to a civil or criminal trial ...In a
trial, the judge sits as an adjudicator, and it is the responsibility of the
parties alone to present the evidence. In an inquiry, the commissioners
are endowed with wide-ranging investigative powers to fulfil their
investigative mandate .... 11
It followed, in the court's view, that public inquiries are not bound by
the evidentiary and procedural rules that pertain in a courtroom. Nor are
they bound by as stringent safeguards against bias. This perspective has
been reinforced by several Australian authorities.7 2 In Karounos v. CAC
(SA), 3 for example, the South Australia Supreme Court held that because
69. The Honourable Barry Penner, then British Columbia Attorney General, cited fiscal restraint
as the driver of the government's decision to refuse funding to the groups: The Canadian Press,
"Advocacy groups denied funding for missing women inquiry," CBC News BC (25 May 2011),
online: CBC <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia>.
70. [1997] 2 FC 527 (FCA).
71. Ibid at para 23. See also the Court ofAppeal for Ontario's decision inEpiscopal Corporation ofthe
Diocese ofAlexandria-Cornwall v Cornwall Public Inquiry Commissioner (2007), 278 DLR (4th) 550
at para 26: "[t]he commission is not asked to resolve a bi-polar dispute over a specific legal or factual
issue. The Commissioner is not entitled to make findings of civil or criminal responsibility. He is faced,
rather, with a broad issue of policy affecting the public at large. His mandate concerns ... a 'polycentric
issue' involving 'a large number of interlocking and interacting interests and considerations."' I give
detailed consideration to the relationship between public inquiries and polycentric issues in Section 3.
72. See, e.g., Donaghue, supra note 58 at 146ff andAustralianLaw Reform Commission, supra note
1 at 377.
73. Karounos v CAC (SA) (1989) 50 SASR 484.
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public inquiries are "purely investigative," "there is.. .no question of the
investigators being judges in their own cause." 4
No one seriously questions the fact that due process is owed to inquiry
witnesses, however. Moreover, it is clear that most public inquiries borrow
heavily from courts in the manner in which they hear and test evidence.
The use of legal counsel to gather, lead, and test evidence in public
hearings may represent, at least in part, a kind of procedural shorthand
borrowed by judicial commissioners from the more familiar context of
the courtroom. But one can also appreciate substantive reasons why some
of the procedural features of courts are suited to public inquiries. If an
important feature of such inquiries is that they be public-so that they can
meaningfully restore confidence in an institution of state, for example-
then it is appropriate that affected parties be afforded an opportunity to be
heard and to contest the views of those whose assertions may be adverse
to them. Moreover, assuming investigation requires the use of coercive
authority in at least some instances to derive evidence from witnesses, then
such witnesses are owed procedural fairness in the face of that authority.
These basic commitments may also reinforce the judicialization
of public inquiries, by inviting legal advocacy as the familiar medium
through which they are expressed. 5 I consider these issues in further detail
in Part III. For now, it suffices to point out that here, too, judges as inquiry
commissioners face a tension between their sense of judicial propriety
and the investigative focus of their inquiries. This is because the demands
of due process, at least as it is traditionally implemented in courts, will
not always coincide with the most procedurally effective methods of
investigation and fact-finding. This observation may seem commonplace,
but it presents judicial commissioners with a range of dilemmas, the
solutions to which are far from clear.
One such dilemma arises in a commissioner's relationship with his or
her counsel. 6 In most public inquiries, commission counsel serves the dual
74. Ibid at 488-489. See also the discussion in Donaghue, supra note 58 at 147.
75. In Consortium Developments v Sarnia, [1998] 3 SCR 3, a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada
placed special emphasis on the fact that an inquiry constituted under Ontario's MunicipalAct, RSO
1990, c M 45 is judicial, owing to the fact that the Act requires the appointment of a superior court
judge as commissioner. This, it was felt, gave a special assurance of fairness to compelled witnesses,
as judicial commissioners could be expected to strike the correct balance between fairness and
the investigative aim of the inquiry (see para 27). The court stopped short of describing particular
procedural or substantive commitments flowing from a commissioner's judicial status.
76. A commissioner's relationship with counsel, and the particular ethical dilemmas and imperatives
to which it gives rise, has been given valuable treatment by several authors-notably Ratushny, supra
note 1 at 215-257; John Sopinka, QC (as he then was), "The Role of Commission Counsel" in A
Paul Pross et al, eds, Commissions ofInquiry (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 75-85; and Justice Dennis
O'Connor, "The role of commission counsel in a public inquiry" (2003) 1 Advocates Soc J 9.
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role of advising the commissioner, as well as gathering, leading, and testing
evidence on behalf of the commission, both before and during the public
hearings of an inquiry. Commission counsel may advise the commissioner
regarding the individuals to be summoned as witnesses, meet with
witnesses to conduct preliminary interviews, prepare warrants to seize
documents and materials, review documentary evidence and determine
which materials are to be produced before the commissioner, examine
and cross-examine witnesses, advise the commissioner on conclusions to
include in his or her final report, and assist the commissioner in drafting
the report. It should be clear that each of these functions blends advisory
and investigative responsibilities. It should also be clear, however, that
the duality of commission counsel's function in this respect may raise
legitimate concerns of fairness on the part of inquiry participants.
Consider a witness who is aggressively cross-examined by commission
counsel. Aggressive cross-examination will, in many instances, be a
vital means of ascertaining the truthfulness of key statements and facts.
Yet from the perspective of the witness, who faces the stigma of public
scrutiny, the threat of findings of misconduct, and the possibility of
indirect legal and personal consequences, this type of examination places
him or her in a situation of adversity.77 He or she may be legitimately
disquieted by the relationship between commissioner and commission
counsel, questioning whether that relationship enables the commissioner
to consider the witness's claims from a position of true neutrality. This is
especially so when the witness lacks assurance that commission counsel,
having completed an aggressive cross-examination, will not subsequently
advise the commissioner about possible findings of misconduct, or even
assist the commissioner in drafting such findings. 8 In such an instance, the
boundaries between judge and prosecutor could be significantly blurred.
The commissioner accordingly faces a difficult decision in how to structure
77. As Ed Ratushny observes, "The reality is ... that rigorous cross-examination cannot be impartial.
It is adverse in interest to the witness. It is adversarial." (supra note 1 at 222). The Honourable
Thomas Braidwood has described his hearings commission into the death of Robert Dziekanski in the
following terms: "The hearings were entirely adversarial. Here, it was obvious that the role ofvarious
persons as they encountered Mr. Dziekanski at the airport would be under close scrutiny, particularly
the four RCMP officers, along with various airport and other staff members": the Honourable Thomas
R Braidwood, QC, "Reflections on the Braidwood Inquiry" in Laverne Jacobs & Sasha Bagley, eds,
Nature ofInquisitorial Processes in Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives (Surrey, England:
Ashgate, 2012) 209 at 215.
78. Sopinka writes: "If [counsel] has been regarded as an adversary or a prosecutor and plays a
role in the writing of the report, justice will not be seen to be done .... A commissioner who intends to
enlist the aid of his counsel in preparing the report must, therefore, bear in mind that if he allows his
gladiator to thrash about in the arena, the latter's transition to the dias may evoke a public clamour"
(Pross et al, supra note 76 at 85).
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his or her relationship with counsel in a manner that balances investigative
efficacy and fairness.
In Canada (AG) v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry on the Blood
System), 9 the Supreme Court heard an appeal by several inquiry
participants who challenged the jurisdiction of a commissioner to issue
notices of possible findings of misconduct against them. One appellant,
the Red Cross Society, raised the fact that commission counsel had
invited all parties with standing at the inquiry to make submissions on
findings of misconduct that might be made against particular witnesses.
These submissions were reviewed in confidence by commission counsel
and not shared with the Commissioner. It was perceived by the appellant
that commission counsel would nevertheless assist the Commissioner in
drafting those findings of misconduct that would be included in his report.
This, they alleged, constituted a breach of procedural fairness, since
commission counsel might be swayed by private submissions that were
never vetted publicly before the Commissioner.
Justice Cory, writing for a unanimous Court, found that although such
an approach could raise legitimate concerns of fairness, the appellant's
objections were premature, since the Commissioner had not yet begun to
draft his report.8" Participants were required to await actual publication
of findings against them before challenging their propriety. Discretion as
to the appropriate role for commission counsel in developing findings of
misconduct was thus deferred to the Commissioner.
This outcome raises two obvious concerns. The first is that if parties are
required to await delivery of a commissioner's report before challenging
the fairness of its findings, the damage to their reputations may already
have been done. The second is that it is unclear how parties are to prove
the improper influence of commission counsel absent incontrovertible
evidence that certain findings were reached as a result of that influence.
In other words, how are parties to know if adverse findings made against
them are based solely on the commissioner's impartial deliberations, or
were influenced by commission counsel behind the scenes?
This issue arose on judicial review of the Stevens Inquiry, which was
constituted to investigate an alleged conflict of interest of a federal cabinet
minister."1 Sinclair Stevens applied to have the inquiry's findings overturned
for unfairness, basing his claim in part on the involvement of commission
79. Krever, supra note 5.
80. Ibidat paras 59-60, 72.
81. Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Facts ofAllegations of Conflict of Interest concerning
the Honourable Sinclair M Stevens (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987)
(Commissioner: the Honourable William Parker).
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counsel-who had conducted a highly adversarial cross-examination-in
preparing the final report.82 Ed Ratushny aptly summarizes the Catch-22
situation in which Stevens found himself
[S]tevens had difficulty in establishing the factual basis for [his] challenge.
He was not able to determine exactly what role commission counsel
actually played in writing the report. There was strong circumstantial
evidence that this role was substantial.... [D]uring the delibeative phase
of the inquiry, commission counsel docketed approximately 1,700 hours.
However, the legal accounts, provided under access-to-infornation
legislation, expurgated the narrative portions that identified the work
performed. This was based on solicitor-client privilege, which was
upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal....
An effort to examine the commissioner as a third party also failed on the
ground of deliberative secrecy. Although this privilege was not absolute,
the prothonotary ruled that there was insufficient evidence of a breach of
the rules of natural justice to override the privilege. 3
In other words, Stevens was required to demonstrate unfairness in
order to lift the veil protecting the commissioner's deliberations with
counsel, yet it was the very secrecy of those deliberations that precipitated
his complaint of unfairness to begin with! Ratushny characterizes the
lack of transparency in a commissioner's relationship with counsel here
as "unseemly.8 4 At the very least, it underscores an ethical dilemma
surrounding a commissioner's relationship with counsel: a close working
relationship will no doubt lend efficacy to an inquiry and perhaps even
facilitate a more robust investigation; yet maximizing fairness to inquiry
witnesses may necessitate boundaries limiting that relationship and placing
greater administrative onus on the commissioner.
The fact that public inquiries are characterized, at least as a formal
matter of law, as investigative rather than adjudicative proceedings thus
raises significant challenges for the judge as an inquiry commissioner. If we
accept the basic principle flowing from the incompatibility jurisprudence
that, in order to maintain the integrity of the judiciary, judges should not
assume administrative duties that defy due process, then the judge must be
attuned to the ways in which investigation and due process may come into
conflict. As with tensions between judicial independence and the political
character of public inquiries, these conflicts may be subtle and not obvious
on the face of an inquiry's mandate or terms of reference. A commissioner's
82. Stevens v Canada (AG), [2005] 2 FCR 629.
83. Ratushny, supra note 1 at 228-229.
84. Ibidat 229.
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relationship with his or her counsel is a case in point. At the outset of
an inquiry it may not be evident to an inquiry commissioner how future
challenges-a recalcitrant witness, the heavy burden of developing factual
findings-will necessitate the use of counsel in a manner that engenders
concerns of unfairness on the part of certain witnesses. Conversely, it
may not be evident how certain measures adopted to maximize fairness,
such as a transparent, arms-length relationship with counsel, may affect a
commissioner's investigation when circumstances demand close direction
or collaboration with counsel. It should be possible, nevertheless, to
establish effective guidelines and principles for how the commissioner
might navigate these dilemmas. That is the object of the next section.
III. The forms and limits ofJudicial inquiry
The tensions outlined above are in many ways produced by a disconnect
between the customs, rules, and procedures of adversarial litigation-
with which the judicial commissioner will be familiar-and the
distinct investigative context of the public inquiry. The refrain in much
jurisprudence and academic commentary on public inquiries is that the
judicial commissioner must be prepared to dispense with an adversarial,
adjudicative format of decision-making so that his or her investigative
mandate may be properly fulfilled. If this is the case, though, then why
is the procedural imprint of courtroom litigation on public inquiries so
strong? Why are witnesses led and cross-examined through counsel? Why
are parties with standing represented by lawyers, and their contributions
framed as "submissions" to be adjudged by the commissioner? To return
to the question posed in the introduction, why are judges, and lawyers
for that matter, relied on so heavily to conduct public inquiries in the first
place?
Michael Trebilcock and Lisa Austin have queried whether the
epistemologies of lawyers and judges lead inevitably to the reproduction
of conventionally adjudicative procedures in new institutional settings-
what they call a "full court press." 5 Drawing from Lon Fuller's seminal
essay "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication," 6 they suggest that
those procedures are sometimes detrimental to efficacy and substantive
85. Michael J Trebilcock & Lisa Austin, "The Limits of the Full Court Press: Of Blood and Mergers"
(1998) 48 UTLJ 1 at 49.
86. Lon L Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv L Rev 353.
The Forms and Limits of Judicial Inquiry: Judges 459
as Inquiry Commissioners in Canada and Australia
justice when adopted outside the adjudicative context." Fuller argued
that adjudication was ill-suited to the resolution of "polycentric issues":
those engaging diffuse societal interests and perspectives, and thus
defying reduction to the binary claims of litigating parties. Many public
inquiries confront issues that are starkly polycentric. On this basis, one
could surmise that the use of judges and lawyers in public inquiries is
fundamentally misguided; that it would be better to conceive of new ways
of conducting inquiries, using new actors whose professional training and
commitments are better calibrated to inquiry purposes. Perhaps the answer
to the dilemmas stated in the previous part is that judges should not accept
inquiry commissions at all, avoiding conflicts between independence and
politicization, or fairness and investigative efficacy, to begin with.
That would be a premature conclusion. There are valid reasons to
employ judges in the leadership of some public inquiries, although closer
attention to their skills and epistemologies may-as Trebilcock and
Austin suggest-recommend a narrower application of that service than
is presently observed. The incompatibility doctrine explicitly connects the
propriety of extra-judicial service with judicial fidelity to the separation
of powers. This requires maintaining independence, avoiding political
decision-making, and observing procedural fairness. We might invert
the doctrine and argue that the circumstances where such values are
most called for are those that demand judicial leadership. This is not an
entirely satisfying justification for the use of judges as commissioners,
however, because judges are not the only individuals who can be trusted
to act independently, to avoid decisions that are politically-based, and to
act fairly. Justifying the use of judges specifically should require a closer
reconciliation of their epistemologies and ethical commitments with the
work of public inquiries. In this part I undertake that task by reconsidering
the account of adjudication presented by Lon Fuller. Like Trebilcock and
Austin, I suggest that Fuller's account of the institutional potential and
limits of adjudication serves as a powerful guide for the boundaries of
legal actors and procedures in new institutional settings. I also conclude,
however, that this account reinforces the service of judges as inquiry
commissioners in certain circumstances. Indeed, it suggests that fidelity to
87. Trebilcock & Austin, supra note 85 at 59. An important, related point is made by Liora Salter
in her article, "The Two Contradictions in Public Inquiries" in Pross et al, supra note 76 at 173.
Salter suggests that inquiries present the potential for radical transformationby brokering dialogue and
participation amongst groups traditionally excluded from policymaking. Yet, the orientation of inquiry
staff to identify pragmatic conclusions, combined with the perception that inquiries "put the state on
trial" and thus invite participants to assume legally contentious, self-interested or adverse positions,
can limit their transformative potential.
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adjudication may provide a clear, powerful analytic device to distinguish
those inquiries suited forjudicial leadership from those that are not, and to
resolve the types of dilemma outlined in Section II.
1. Fuller'sforms and limits of adjudication
Fuller considered that the core, indispensable feature of each type of "social
ordering" is the manner in which it engages the participation of affected
individuals."8 In the case of elections, individuals participate by voting;
in contracts, by negotiation. 9 The distinct mode of participation fostered
by adjudication, he argued, is "that of presenting proofs and reasoned
arguments for a decision in [one's] favour."9 Adjudication consists in
parties advocating for a particular decision based on factual assertions
that corroborate some form of "reasoned" argument, or argument based
on principle (as opposed to naked self-interest). This form of participation
presupposes a decision-maker charged with hearing and deciding the
parties' claims. For that matter, it presupposes the existence of a dispute,
and in this sense is intrinsically adversarial, requiring the translation
of parties' competing interests into a language of rational claims to be
adjudged on some basis of principle. This type of adversarialism is to be
lauded, because an adversarial contest-in which each affected party has an
equal and thorough opportunity to be heard-establishes a sound basis for
impartial decision-making. Fuller observed: "[t]he institution of advocacy
is not a concession to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of
human insight in the design of a social framework within which man's
capacity for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization."9
Fuller did not intend that this account of the essential qualities of
adjudication be merely descriptive. In describing what is necessary for a
process to truly be "adjudicative," he intended also to define what is essential
for that process to generate a particular social value. Adjudication gives
the parties affected by a decision special influence over the evidentiary and
principled bases on which the decision is to be reached. By requiring their
claims to be stated in the form of proofs and reasoned arguments, it also
converts those claims into a rational discourse. The decisions produced by
adjudication are thus characteristically different from those produced by
other forms of "social ordering":
Adjudication is... a device which gives formal and institutional
expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs. As
88. Fuller, supra note 86 at 363.
89. Ibid at 363-364.
90. Ibid at 364 [emphasis added].
91. Ibid at 384.
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such it assumes a burden of rationality not borne by any other form of
social ordering. A decision which is the product of reasoned argument
must be prepared itself to meet the test of reason. We demand of an
adjudicative decision a kind of rationality we do not expect of the results
of contract or of voting. This higher responsibility toward rationality is
at once the strength and the weakness of adjudication as a form of social
ordering.92
The latter caveat is important. Fuller did not contend that adjudicated
decisions were intrinsically superior to those reached through alternate
means. He claimed, rather, that they possess a particular form of rationality
instilled by the adjudicative process: a decision premised on the reasoned
claims of participants must itself speak in the language of reason. That is,
the parties to adjudication are entitled to a decision that genuinely addresses
the proofs and reasoned arguments placed before the adjudicator. This,
in turn, is the source of an adjudicative decision's authority: a decision
that truly addresses proofs and reasoned arguments from a position of
impartiality should assure the parties of its justice. Herein lies the special
value of adjudication: it is a form of decision-making that offers an
especially high assurance of justice to affected parties, by affording them
a strong influence over the basis of decision-making and by demanding a
decision that rationally addresses their own reasoned claims.
The particular rationality of adjudicative decision-making is also a
weakness. This is its inefficacy in managing decisions that are not reducible
to competing proofs and reasoned arguments-Fuller's "polycentric"
issues. Fuller described polycentric issues through the metaphor of a
spider-web, in which a pull on any single thread will redistribute tensions
and affect the entire structure.93 Questions of public policy, engaging
diffuse societal interests and effects, are quintessentially polycentric. In
traditional litigation, the judge's role is largely passive, with the parties
themselves directing the questions that the judge is ultimately charged
with deciding. This accords with an assumption that it is the litigating
parties who will bear the received effects of the decision. As such, where
decisions necessarily affect diverse stakeholders and interests, relying on
the claims of bilateral disputants will prove inadequate. Some issues may
demand managerial resolution by an official possessing special knowledge,
expertise, and resources to reconcile diverse societal demands. Others may
demand the creativity and democratic accountability of elected officials.
By advocating different forms of "social ordering" to address a range of
92. Ibidat 366-367.
93. Ibid at 395.
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matters, Fuller would seem to have envisioned a heterogeneous state-one
in which a range of "social orderings" coincide to address issues for which
they are individually suited.
2. Public inquiries and adjudication
Where do public inquiries fit within such a state? To answer this we must
consider the issues that public inquiries are intended to address, and in
particular, whether those issues are inherently polycentric. The example
considered by Trebilcock and Austin-that of the Krever Inquiry into the
tainted blood scandal of the 1980s94-appears at first blush to be highly
polycentric. Commissioner Krever was tasked to "review and report
on the mandate, organization, management, operations, financing, and
regulation of all activities of the blood system in Canada, including the
events surrounding the contamination of the blood system in Canada in
the early 1980s.... "9 This clearly was a sweeping investigative mandate,
demanding that the Commissioner scrutinize the interrelationship of
numerous state and non-state organizations and formulate conclusions of
policy rather than law. Yet the Commissioner was also directed to make
a factual inquiry concerning a specific sequence of events precipitating
the blood-contamination crisis. This would no doubt involve hearing
from those implicated directly in the events, including victims. It would
also involve confronting the possibility of fault on the part of specific
individuals and organizations.
These twin considerations-affording affected individuals the
opportunity to be heard, and confronting the possibility of wrongdoing-
may begin to introduce adjudicative qualities into the inquiry process. This
is particularly so when we consider the characteristic features of the inquiry
from the perspectives of the participants. For the individual participant-
whether an involuntary witness or a party who has sought standing-the
opportunity to be heard serves more than the utilitarian, investigative
mandate of the inquiry. It is an opportunity to be heard in respect of how
that mandate specifically bears on them. For the victim, this may involve
seeking vindication in the form of official recognition of mistreatment
that has been denied and assurance that appropriate ameliorative steps
will be taken. For individuals and organizations implicated in possible
wrongdoing, it may involve seeking a different sort of vindication, or at
least ensuring that any blame attributed to them does not exceed that for
94. Canada, Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada, Final Report (Ottawa: Minister
of Supply and Services, 1997) (Commissioner: the Honourable Horace Krever).
95. Trebilcock & Austin, supra note 85 at 20.
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which they are actually responsible. It is easy to discern in this dynamic
the propensity for competing-and even adversarial-viewpoints.
This point is even more pronounced when we consider the Australian
and Canadian public inquiries discussed earlier. The inquiry in Canellis
charged an official with deciding between two outcomes: either confirming
the criminal guilt of an individual or attributing criminal responsibility,
albeit in legally non-binding terms, to others. As such, the main parties
to that inquiry were directly opposed in interest, and the conduct of the
inquiry intrinsically adversarial. The question raised on judicial review in
Canellis-whether an involuntary, indigent witness is entitled to publicly-
financed counsel-also centrally concerned an interest characteristic of
adjudicative proceedings: the assurance that affected parties be granted a
generous opportunity to be heard, and allowed to articulate a factual and
principled basis on which a decision should be taken, before an impartial
decision-maker.
The MWCI confronted difficult issues surrounding the opportunity for
affected parties to be heard. Although not constituted to decide between
two, diametrically-opposed versions of events, the inquiry bore directly
on the experiences of individuals, communities, and groups that had
previously felt excluded and ostracized by official institutions. Indeed,
one of the inquiry's central investigative tasks was to determine why
the police had not paid greater heed to the concerns of friends, family
members, and groups working with vulnerable women in Vancouver's
downtown eastside, at a time when police intervention might have
prevented many avoidable deaths. For these community participants,
the opportunity to be heard signalled the opportunity to redress previous
experiences of exclusion. It was an opportunity to have those experiences
publicly recognized, to demand a response on behalf of the individuals
and agencies responsible for their exclusion, and to counter any denial of
responsibility." For the individuals and agencies themselves-notably the
Vancouver Police Department, the RCMP, and individual police officers
involved in the missing women investigations-the inquiry represented
96. See generally BCCLA, supra note 59.
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a setting in which adverse findings could be made against them.9" This in
itself engaged an interest in being fully and fairly heard, even if in some
instances this involved acknowledging wrongdoing. These examples too,
then, illustrate that for inquiry participants, the opportunity to be heard
on procedurally equal terms, to be permitted meaningful advocacy even
where this means casting blame or confronting suspicions and allegations,
and to be treated with impartiality and fairness by the Commissioner, were
paramount considerations. Each of these are values strongly reinforced by
traditional adjudicative decision-making.
Pointing out that public inquiries may share features in common with
adjudication does not, of course, justify characterizing such inquiries as
adjudicative. But it should be enough to question categorical assumptions
that they are investigative or non-adversarial, and thereby not beholden
to stringent standards of due process. It would be more accurate to
acknowledge that public inquiries blend investigative functions with
adjudicative ones, the latter deriving from the fact that a public hearing
of controversial, contested issues is likely to involve adverse claims, and
from the fact that some participants may legitimately demand standards of
due process approaching those of a formally adjudicative setting. Defining
public inquiries as hybrid institutions is hardly profound, but it serves as
an important reminder that adjudicative values should not be dismissed
summarily as complicating the process of investigation. For one thing,
the accuracy of that assumption is dubious: recall that in both Canellis
and the MfWCI, hearing more fully from affected parties may have
strengthened the basis of investigative conclusions. For another, it places
undue emphasis on the utilitarian goals of an inquiry-the pursuit of an
investigate mandate-at the expense of its deliberative value as perceived
by individuals and groups directly affected.
This point is deepened by referring to a well-known critique of Fuller's
account of adjudication, which questions its relevance tojudicial expression
and enforcement of constitutional values. Writing in 1979, Owen Fiss's
archetypal counterpoint to Fuller was America's tortured experience with
the desegregation of public schools-a process that required detailed
97. As the Commissioner himself observed: "That critical police failures in the missing women
investigations resulted from discriminatory policing or systemic institutional bias is highly contested.
It is an issue with an absolute division between the non-police participants and the police in this
inquiry. Counsel for the VPD, the RCMP, and the Vancouver Police Union, as well as most of the
individual police officers with independent counsel, utterly rejected these arguments, emphasizing
the lack of evidence necessary to substantiate these serious crimes." See MWCI, Executive Summary,
supra note 13 at 93. Counsel for the families represented at the inquiry went so far as to allege a
deliberate cover-up on the part of the police. The Commissioner considered and flatly rejected this
allegation (ibid at 105).
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judicial oversight of the administration of certain school districts in order
to enforce compliance with the constitutional guarantee of equality.98 Had
judges limited themselves simply to declaring the winner of bilaterally
litigated disputes, and not grappled with the polycentric exercise of
enforcing structural remedies, their rulings would have had no meaningful
effect. These remedies, and the constitutional values which necessitated
them, demanded that judges take account of societal interests and effects
beyond those raised by the parties; that is, the judges were required to look
beyond simply the "proofs and reasoned arguments" placed before them.
The duty for judges to look beyond the proofs and arguments of
disputing parties and to account for broader societal interests and effects
would seem to apply generally in the modem context of constitutional
adjudication. This is evident in the Canadian approach to determining the
legitimacy of limitations on constitutional rights. Proportionality analysis,
flowing from section 1 of the Charter, asks that judges consider whether a
rights-infringing law has a pressing and substantial objective, whether the
measures it employs are reasonably connected to that objective, whether
it impairs a constitutional right to only the minimum extent necessary,
and whether the benefits secured by the law are proportionate to the
constitutional injury they entail.99 This form of inquiry-particularly
the last step, which asks that a court assess the societal effect of a law-
seems starkly polycentric. Indeed, it is a familiar practice in Canadian
constitutional litigation for intervener parties to be granted standing in
order to furnish the courts with a broader societal perspective on which to
base their decisions. It is also typical for parties to include social science
data, academic commentary, and a host of other "non-legal" materials
in their court briefings. Accordingly, it is reasonable to ask whether
Fuller's account of adjudication is unduly narrow in light of contemporary
constitutional practice.
It may be that the parties to contemporary constitutional litigation
present the courts with a range of complex societal data and considerations,
and indeed the courts may even account for these factors on their own
initiative in crafting efficacious legal outcomes. Yet the manner of
participation by the parties to an adjudicated dispute, and the special
assurance of justice they derive from it, remains the same. As TRS
Allan points out, the value of adjudication is especially important in the
98. Owen Fiss, "The Forms of Justice" (1979) 93 Harv L Rev 1.
99. These criteria were stated for the first time in Canadian jurisprudence by the Supreme Court inR
v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, but their origins lie in converging constitutional practices shared by many
countries. See Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitation, translated
by Doron Kalir (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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context of constitutional litigation.1"' Here, the obligation of both parties
(the individual and the state) to present their claims in equivalent terms
(via proofs and reasoned arguments) before an impartial adjudicator (the
independent court) structures them as equals. This serves as an important
source of assurance for an individual forced to comply with official
authority: having been heard on equal and impartial terms by the judge,
a reasonable basis for compliance with the judge's decision is thereby
established; participants are given a special assurance that the outcome is
not arbitrary.1"1
This also helps to illuminate why adjudicative procedures may be
important to certain types of public inquiry. If the rule of law is taken
to be a bulwark against the arbitrary exercise of state authority, then by
implication it demands that the state account for the received effects of
its laws on individuals. Indeed, the section 1 analysis discussed earlier
is centrally oriented to ensuring that the individualized effects of laws
are fair and just. Constitutional adjudication is thus a means of satisfying
individuals of the justness of laws as they individually affect them, just
as it is a source of vindication for those individuals who have suffered
under unjust laws. Do certain public inquiries not serve a strikingly similar
purpose?
Consider again how the public inquiries discussed in this paper are
viewed from the perspectives of their participants. Kalajzich sought the
opportunity to challenge his criminal conviction before an authority
charged with conducting a thorough and impartial review. While the
state was the initiator of the inquiry in Canellis, it was also a party acting
through the Ministry of the Attorney General, and sought to persuade the
Commissioner of the veracity of Kalajzich's conviction. The compelled
witnesses, whose claims sparked an application for judicial review, sought
both to rebuke Kalajzich's accusations and to insulate themselves against
the harsh effects of the inquiry. The latter required, in their view, that they
be afforded access to counsel and to meaningful advocacy. The public
inquiry thus established a procedural means by which the justness (that is,
the non-arbitrariness) of a legal effect on Kalajzich could be confirmed. The
compelled witnesses, in claiming rights to counsel, sought the opportunity
to demand justification for the effects of the public inquiry itself on them.
What the parties sought from the public inquiry, in other words, is similar
100. TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001) at 8-9.
101. Ibid.
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to what parties seek from constitutional adjudication: to challenge (or at
minimum, to verify) the justice of official authority.
A similar observation can be made about the participants in the
MWCl. For the family members of murdered and disappeared women,
the inquiry signalled an opportunity to hold the state to account for its
failure to accord their loved ones the equal care and treatment to which
they were entitled. The same is true of those community groups who
were granted standing but denied legal funding-they too sought official
recognition of the experiences of exclusion suffered by their clients and
members, and to call to account those state agencies responsible for it.
Conversely, individual police officers and the police collectively no doubt
expected the opportunity to respond to certain accusations at the inquiry,
and to ensure that adverse findings made against them were limited to
those with credible factual foundation. This would also involve having the
Commissioner recognize the reasonableness of official decisions that have
been unfairly subjected to critique. Again, the parties' participation in the
inquiry related fundamentally to evaluating the justice of official power.
These observations are significant because they suggest that there
is a substantive, principled basis for the use of adjudicative procedural
forms in some types of public inquiry. As in the case of constitutional
adjudication, an inquiry commissioner does not consider the positions of
inquiry participants exclusively in weighing their claims; rather, he or she
is forced to consider the relationship between those claims and the broader
context and purpose of the inquiry. Attention to these considerations
denies participants total control over the basis on which the commissioner
will reach decisions, and thus departs from a classic adjudicative model
as Fuller likely envisioned it. Moreover, the additional considerations
weighed by a commissioner may be polycentric, and the commissioner
may instantiate additional processes to gather relevant information and
broader societal perspectives that bear on his or her work. Yet, as is the case
in constitutional adjudication, mere confrontation with polycentric issues
does not alter the fact that a core aspect of the process is adjudicative-
that the commissioner owes participants equal procedural opportunity to
present proofs and reasoned arguments regarding contested issues that
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seriously affect them.10 2 We can begin to see the value of judges' and
lawyers' professional contributions in this context, and link back to some
of the guidance offered by the Australian jurisprudence on incompatibility.
The jurisprudence on incompatibility requires that judges "behave
judicially" even in the setting of extra-judicial appointments. This means,
at minimum, that they afford due process to those affected by the exercise
of their extra-judicial powers. It also requires that they remain independent.
However, it should be clear that judges are not the only officials capable
of observing these values. Fuller's theory of adjudication provides an
account of what it means to "behave judicially" in a more formal sense-
by allowing those affected by a decision to influence its formulation
through the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments to an impartial
arbiter, and thus affording them special assurance of the justice of a final
outcome. Although judges are not the only officials that adjudicate, this is
certainly an area in which they can claim special, distinguishing expertise,
and the capacity to instil public confidence at the highest level.
Fuller himself acknowledged that protecting the value of adjudication
did not require the carbon-copying of courtroom litigation in all
adjudicative contexts. Adjudication can be mixed with other institutional
forms. Of particular relevance to public inquiries, Fuller recognized that
processes initiated by an arbitral authority rather than by disputing parties,
could nevertheless be adjudicative.0 3 He even conceded that adjudicators
sometimes confront polycentric issues, observing: "It is not, then, a
question of distinguishing black from white. It is a question of knowing
when the polycentric elements have become so significant and predominant
that the proper limits of adjudication have been reached." 104 These limits
are determined by asking whether the essential value of adjudication is
preserved: "Whatever destroys the meaning of ... participation [by proofs
and reasoned arguments] destroys the integrity of adjudication itself." 5
102. A Wayne Mackay has taken up a related point in challenging generalizations about the gulf
between lawyers' and policy-makers' values in the inquiry setting. He writes: "There is, of course,
some conflict of values between the lawyers and the policy makers but the degree has been
exaggerated .... [T]he Charter has not been used by the courts to remake inquiries in accordance with
lawyers' values. While individual lawyers are oriented towards the rights of particular clients, judges
are very conscious of the collective good of the larger society and reflect this in their rulings from the
bench and as commissioners. Similarly, administrators are also concerned about the fair treatment
of individuals in the broader sense, as well as the efficient execution of public policy." See A Wayne
MacKay, "Mandates, Legal Foundations, Powers and Conduct of Commissions of Inquiry" in Pross et
al, supra note 76, 29 at 43.
103. Fuller, supra note 86 at 385ff.
104. Ibid at 398.
105. Ibid at 364 [emphasis added].
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3. Resolving the tensions ofjudicial inquiries
I suggested earlier that the analytic requirements of the incompatibility
doctrine might be deepened-and the special dilemmas confronting inquiry
commissioners resolved-by requiring judges to honour the basic value of
adjudication in assuming leadership of a public inquiry. It is now possible
to more fully articulate this approach, which can be implemented by
judges asking themselves, prior to acceptance of an inquiry appointment:
"Can I fulfil this appointment in a manner that preserves the basic value
of adjudication?"
There are two parts to this question. The first, "Can I fulfil..." concerns
the judge's ability to effectively carry out the assigned task. Concerning
an investigative mandate, for example, the judge must ask whether he
or she will be able to gather and assess the evidence necessary to reach
accurate factual conclusions. If the judge's task is also policy oriented,
the judge must ask whether he or she can become sufficiently informed of
the range of pertinent issues and societal interests to formulate effective
proposals. The latter part of the question, "while allowing those affected
by my decisions to participate" qualifies the first; it requires that the
judge fulfil the investigative or policy goals of an inquiry while allowing
those seriously affected by the process an opportunity participate by the
presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments, and to receive an impartial
hearing at the standard rightly demanded of ajudge. In effect, it challenges
the judge to consider whether his or her fidelity to independence and due
process-and the distinct adjudicative forms to which that fidelity gives
nse-are in fact suited to the extra-judicial task at hand. The question
reinforces a connection between efficiency and principle: it postulates
that those tasks which judges are optimally suited to address are those
that appeal to a judicial sense of fair process, requiring the professional
discretion and skills such a process entails.
To illustrate the practical applicability of this approach, we may
return to the dilemmas outlined in the previous Part. The first concerned
a tension between independence and the political character of inquiries.
We saw that in both Canellis and the MWCI the political decision to
deny financing for the legal representation of certain inquiry participants
significantly curtailed the discretion of the respective Commissioners.
More specifically, it undermined what the Commissioners viewed as
being appropriate to ensure fairness, and what they considered beneficial
to the execution of their investigative mandates. In both instances, this
form of political intervention diminished the extent to which the inquiries
were able to foster procedural equality amongst participants who were
significantly affected by the issues concerned, and who legitimately
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demanded a high assurance ofjustice in the final outcomes. Now consider
how these issues might have been anticipated, and possibly averted, had
the respective Commissioners been required-prior to the assumption of
their inquiries-to ponder the question: "Can I fulfil this appointment in a
manner that preserves the basic value of adjudication?"
As a threshold issue, this would have involved querying whether
the mandates of the respective inquiries were suited to allowing affected
parties the opportunity to participate through the presentation of proofs
and reasoned arguments (or conversely, whether the subject-matter of
each inquiry was too polycentric to be accommodated by this manner of
participation). Given that the inquiry in Canellis constituted the review
of proceedings that were themselves adjudicative, with directly opposing
factual claims on the part of the witnesses, the Commissioner could easily
have satisfied himself of this threshold issue.
TheMWCIpresents a more challenging case. British Columbia's Public
Inquiry Act. 6 allows for the appointment of "Hearing Commissions"-
which exercise coercive powers to attain evidence, hold formal evidentiary
hearings, and reach findings of individual misconduct-and "Study
Commissions," which do not possess equivalent powers but are intended to
facilitate more flexible and inclusive means of community consultation."' 7
The MWCI was initially appointed as a hearing commission exclusively.
Public concern over its relatively narrow terms of reference, and the
possibility that formal hearings would deter participation by socially
marginalized individuals and groups, motivated the Commissioner to
request, and the government to grant, an extension to his mandate to
include a study commission phase. The Commissioner interpreted the
hearings phase of his inquiry to concern those portions of his mandate that
required him to make investigative determinations: namely, to assess the
adequacy of the police investigations and the circumstances surrounding a
1998 decision to stay a prosecution against Robert Pickton. He interpreted
the study phase of his inquiry to concern the formulation of forward-
looking recommendations to improve the conduct of missing person and
suspected homicide investigations in the province. While conclusions
drawn from the hearings phase would also inform the Commissioner's
policy recommendations, findings of fact were the exclusive purview of the
hearings phase. This bifurcation of proceedings would appear to anticipate
that the investigative focus of the inquiry involved highly contested facts
and serious allegations necessitating reasonable opportunities for affected
106. Supra note 61.
107. See ibid, Part 3, Division 3 and Division 2, respectively.
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parties to be heard. It would be appropriate for the Commissioner to
anticipate that participants in this phase of the inquiry would expect a
manner of participation, and an assurance of fairness, equivalent to that of
an adjudicative hearing. As such, he might credibly have answered "yes"
to the question of whether this aspect of the inquiry could be conducted in
a manner honouring the basic value of adjudication, while still fulfilling
its investigative mandate.
Having satisfied themselves that their inquiries could be conducted in
a manner that honours the basic value of adjudication, the Commissioners
would have been obliged to consider what this would require as a practical
reality. In both Canellis and the MWCJ, it would not have been difficult
to anticipate that those parties eventually denied funding for legal
representation were likely to factor prominently in inquiry hearings, and
to seek comprehensive rights of standing, representation, and advocacy.
In the case of Canellis, the witnesses were inseparably linked to the
matter under investigation. Their participation was involuntary, and the
inquiry exposed them to a very high degree of prejudice, including the
possibility of findings that could eventuate criminal prosecution. In the
AMWCJ, the parties represented the communities most directly affected by
the events precipitating the inquiry. Indeed, it was the allegations of these
communities-of having their complaints and warnings ignored by police
and justice officials-that served as the central basis for instigating an
inquiry to begin with. Moreover, the parties were in a unique position to
speak to the experiences of the missing and murdered women themselves,
having worked with the women as service providers, advocates, and
members of a shared community.
Preserving the value of adjudication would have brought the necessity
of affording these participants legal representation into sharp relief It
would have obliged the Commissioners to consider not only that they
owed participants impartiality and due process, but impartiality and due
process at a level and form expected of a judge. The Commissioners
might then have required, as a condition of their appointment, assurance
that adequate resources be available to support legal representation and
participation by key participants who lacked financial means. This is
hardly a controversial suggestion: it simply adds greater specificity to a
requirement already stipulated in the Canadian Judicial Council's Protocol
on the Appointment of Judges to Commissions of Inquiry."8 The latter
requires that superior court judges approached to conduct a public inquiry
108. Canadian Judicial Council, Protocol on the Appointment of Judges to Commissions of Inquiry
(August 2010), online: Canadian Judicial Council <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca>.
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carefully scrutinize the proposed appointment, in consultation with
the chief justices of their respective jurisdiction, to determine whether
the subject-matter of the inquiry is appropriate for judicial service and
whether proper budgetary measures are in place.1"9 A similar approach is
taken by the state bench of New South Wales."' Assurance as to proper
legal financing for inquiry participants-in the form of an undertaking
from the appointing government-should form part of this assessment.11
An obligation to honour the basic value of adjudication would make such
assurances a matter of course, especially where the subject-matter of an
inquiry clearly affects individuals and groups who are likely to lack means
of independently financing legal representation.
The second tension discussed above-that between due process and
the investigative nature of public inquiries-is also brought into sharp
relief by the question, "Can I fulfil this mandate in a manner that maintains
the basic value of adjudication?" This tension was considered in the
previous part through the example of the commissioner's relationship with
commission counsel. Explicit attention to the demands of adjudication
might lead a commissioner to a host of procedural innovations tailored
to the particular exigencies of his or her inquiry. At minimum, it would
underscore an ethical imperative for the commissioner to disclose the
nature of his or her relationship with counsel-for example, by making
public (rather than private) directions when asking commission counsel
to clarify or focus examination on certain key issues; by declaring that
commission counsel will not take direction from the commissioner in
responding to any interlocutory motions raised during the inquiry, so that
the commissioner can hear those motions in an unbiased and adjudicative
manner; by divulging the extent of the commissioner's involvement in
directing the gathering and preliminary review of inquiry evidence, and
declaring that findings will only be based on evidence and testimony
introduced in public hearings; and by declaring that the commissioner will
neither discuss nor deliberate with counsel on any findings of individual
misconduct, nor involve counsel in drafting related portions of the final
report.
109. Ibid at ss 2(c) and 3(f).
110. See Campbell & Lee, supra note 16 at 171.
111. It is intriguing to note that Tasmania's public inquiries statute empowers commissioners to
require that the Crown reimburse legal costs for inquiry witnesses: see Commissions ofInquiry Act
1995 (Tas), s 36. In fairness, it must be acknowledged that the denial of funding to inquiry participants
in the MWCI was unprecedented, and the recommendation I offer here is made with the benefit of
hindsight. At the time of his appointment, there would have been no obvious reason for Commissioner
Oppal to doubt that reasonable funding requests would be honoured.
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In inquiries that are especially adversarial, and where it is anticipated
that findings against certain witnesses may be severe (as in Canellis), a
commissioner might take the further step of bifurcating his or her legal staff
into advisory and inquisitorial teams. The former would be responsible for
advising the commissioner and assisting him or her in reaching conclusions
and preparing a final report, leaving the latter unfettered to conduct cross-
examinations in an adversarial context. This is the approach advocated by
Ed Ratushny and implemented successfully in the Lamer Inquiry on which
he served.112 It depends, of course, on strong ethical boundaries limiting
communication between the commissioner, advisory, and investigative
counsel. It would also rely on the commissioner deferring responsibility for
the conduct of hearings largely to his or her counsel, with the commissioner
offering only high-level direction. The commissioner's consequent
sacrifice of a measure of control over his investigative mandate-that is,
by ceding the direction of hearings to counsel-would be justified by the
exceptional prejudice faced by certain participants.
Again, the merit in honouring the value of adjudication in the inquiry
process lies in recognizing that some inquiries legitimately demand
standards of impartiality and due process at the high level expected of
a judge. It subverts the flawed thinking that because inquiries have
investigative or policy mandates, and are formally different from trials,
judicial commissioners are liberated to observe relaxed standards of fairness
toward participants. In some instances, inquiries demand the special
assurance of justice instilled by an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing
this provides a rational account of why judges should lead such inquiries.
In turn, it suggests that for those aspects of inquiry proceedings which
demand that assurance, judges should behave judicially-that is, they
should honour the basic value of adjudication by providing participants
the opportunity to be equally and impartially heard by means of proofs and
reasoned arguments. I turn finally to consider how this insight may help
distil the proper limits of judge-led commissions of inquiry.
4. Discerning the limits ofjudicial inquiries
In 2012, the B.C. Civil Liberties Association, West Coast LEAF and
Pivot Legal Society published a report entitled Blueprint for an Inquiry:
Learning from the Failures of the Missing Women Commission of
Inquiry."3 Taking the shortcomings of the MWCI as its impetus, the report
contains a number of valuable recommendations for the improvement of
112. Ratushny, supra note 1 at 230-236.
113. BCCLA, supra note 59.
474 The Dalhousie Law Journal
future commissions. These include measures to facilitate testimony from
vulnerable witnesses and to accord their experiences due evidentiary
weight, and a requirement that commissioners and commission counsel
be compensated at rates commensurate with service in the public sector so
that greater budgetary resources might be available to support community
participation. A further theme of the report is that inquiries such as the
AMCI should serve as transitional justice instruments instilling truth and
reconciliation amongst participants.114 This is not to suggest that official
accountability ceases to be a central aim of such inquiries; indeed, the
MWCJ was obliged to provide "an opportunity to create a public record
and make findings of fact regarding the missing women investigations,"
and "to hold those who failed to ensure the safety of vulnerable women
accountable." '115 The authors nevertheless suggest these goals are not
incompatible: "[inquiries] must find a way to reconcile backward-looking,
truth-seeking functions with forward-looking, policy-making functions,
all while promoting healing and reconciliation among affected individuals
and communities. 116
The latter claim must be approached with diffidence. The police
organizations (and in some cases, individual officers) who participated
in the MWCI were subject to serious allegations of bias, racism, sexism,
cover-up, neglect, and incompetence. The gravity of these allegations
necessitated strong procedural rights for participants. It also underscored
the importance of securing procedural equality for the individuals and
groups who made them, and who were subjected to the indignity of being
denied legal representation while their interlocutors were defended with
public funds. In his final report, Commissioner Oppal attributed the failure
of police to protect women in Vancouver's downtown eastside largely to
systemic bias reflecting broader societal prejudices and misconceptions.
He criticized some individual officers-although deliberately focusing for
the most part on organizational failures-and vindicated the conduct of
others. While the adequacy of these conclusions has been questioned (in
part, for the very reason that key participants were excluded) few would
doubt that the questions they sought to address-what went wrong? why
did this happen?-were important predicates to establishing a more trusting
and conciliatory relationship between the affected communities and the
police. Provided these questions were to be confronted in a public forum,
with witnesses being called to account for their actions and participants
114. This argument is also made forcefully by Stanton, supra note 59.
115. BCCLA, supra note 59 at 19.
116. Ibid.
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afforded the opportunity to conduct examinations and make allegations,
it is difficult to imagine how some measure of adversarialism could have
been avoided. Commissioner Oppal recommended that further deliberative
processes, with the exclusive goals of healing and reconciliation, should
follow his inquiry.117 One of the great misfortunes of the MWCI is that
this and other recommendations were diminished by a flawed and unequal
process. It is also regrettable that those aspects of the MfWCI procedure
that did broker alternatives to the adversarial hearing of evidence lacked
credibility and broad participation due to the shortcomings of the formal
hearings.
In weighing the potential for judge-led inquiries to promote truth and
reconciliation, it is worthwhile to consider the example of Canada's Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which recently completed its
last national event and will submit a final report in 2015. The TRC was
established pursuant to a settlement agreement between Indian Residential
School (IRS) survivors, the federal government and several churches that
had been responsible for administering the schools. A non-adversarial,
voluntary process of healing and reconciliation was considered a necessary
counterpart to the formal acknowledgment of blame embodied in the
settlement agreement. The TRC's mandate is thus markedly different
from a commission of inquiry constituted to discern the truth in contested
events, as Kim Stanton has observed,
[i]n Canada, where the government and the churches have acknowledged
that abuses occurred and that the IRS system was harmful, the evidence
that is presented to the TRC is not for the purpose of convincing the
Commissioners that the abuses occurred. The TRC is occurring
separately from the reparations process and other elements of the
Settlement Agreement." 8
This is reflected in the TRC's terms of reference, which are prefaced
by a statement of guiding principles:
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission will build upon the "Statement
of Reconciliation" dated January 7, 1998 and the principles developed by
the Working Group on Truth and Reconciliation and of the Exploratory
Dialogues (1998-1999). These principles are as follows: accessible;
victim-centred; confidentiality (if required by the former student);
do no hann; health and safety of participants; representative; public/
transparent; accountable; open and honourable process; comprehensive;
inclusive, educational, holistic, just and fair; respectful; voluntary;
117. See MWCI, Executive Summary, supra note 13 at 161.
118. Kim Stanton, "Canada's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Settling the Past?" (2011) 2
International Indigenous Policy Journal 1 at 5.
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flexible; and forward looking in terms of rebuilding and renewing
Aboriginal relationships and the relationship between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal Canadians." 9
Consistent with these principles, the TRC has no power to subpoena
evidence or to compel the attendance of witnesses, and "shall not hold
formal hearings, nor act as a public inquiry, nor conduct a formal legal
process."120 It is forbidden from naming names in its account ofwrongdoing,
and any proceedings in which allegations are made against identifiable
persons must be conducted in camera.2 In its 2012 Interim Report, the
TRC emphasized the centrality of statement gathering, or "truth sharing"
to its mandate:
The Commission is committed to providing every former residential
student-and every person whose life was affected by the residential
school system-with the opportunity to create a record of that experience.
... Since there are estimated to be at least 80,000 living former students,
the magnitude and complexity of the Commission's commitment are
significant. 22
At the time of the Interim Report, through public sharing circles,
commission hearings, and private sessions conducted by trained statement-
gatherers, the TRC had collected over 1800 statements. 123 It had also
hosted two national events reflecting the educative and holistic goals of
the commission, including artistic installations, musical performances, the
display of archival materials, children and youth programs, and a range of
other activities in addition to the formal gathering of statements. 124
The point of this example is to show that-at least in the context of
Canada's TRC-healing and reconciliation have been treated as formally
distinct from the identification of wrongdoing and allocation of blame.
Indeed, healing and reconciliation command an altogether different
procedure, and a different underlying notion of accountability that stresses
voluntanness and collective responsibility to acknowledge wrongs and
build new relationships. One can easily imagine how the introduction of
adversarialism would be detrimental to this process.
119. Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Our Mandate, online: Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of Canada <htp://www.trc.ca>.
120. Ibid at 2(b) and (c).
121. Ibid at 2(h) and (i).
122. Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Interim Report (Winnipeg: Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2012) at 12.
123. Ibid at 13.
124. Ibid at 18-21.
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I do not mean to suggest that all processes pursuing goals of healing
and reconciliation should mimic the TRC. However, even in contexts where
the attribution of wrong is an institutional objective-but is combined
with the effort to restore relationships between conflicting parties-the
initial starting points and expectations of participants will be key. In a
2003 report on alternatives to the traditional adversarial system ofjustice,
the Law Commission of Canada observed:
[A] consensus-based justice approach requires disputants to reconceive
their conflict as one in which certain solutions other than a win-lose
outcome are possible. To achieve even the possibility of such solutions,
disputants must embrace some of the hallmarks of a consensus-based
justice vision, including openness, direct-dealing and longer-term vision.
Justice as it is conceptualized and practiced in both restorative justice and
consensus-based justice traditions is multidimensional. Both approaches
reject the idea that a just outcome may only be consistent with pre-
existing rules. Instead, the presumption goes the other way-that in
almost every case the solution is integrative, rather than winner-take-all.
For restorative justice advocates, notions of harm and responsibility are
more complex than a simple determination of right and wrong. 125
This shared conception of justice may not be feasible in circumstances
where the very existence of a wrong, or its nature and extent, are vigorously
contested. Formal alternatives to adversarial disputes are contingent on
the motivation and goals of participants. There will likely remain cases
where disputes are trenchant and demand a public hearing. For those
circumstances, adjudication may be necessary to afford procedural
equality and fairness to participants, despite its limitations in brokering
consensus and reconciliation.
These will be the circumstances most suited to judicial leadership
of an inquiry. A judge approached to conduct an inquiry whose mandate
expresses goals of healing and reconciliation must consider whether the
adjudicative methods in which he or she has been inculcated would inflict
more harm than good. If a different procedural approach is required,
reinforcing different goals and expectations amongst participants from
the outset, then the judge must ask whether he or she has the requisite
skills and abilities beyond the traditional judicial role to complete the task
effectively. Moreover, given that such an assignment will lack the intrinsic
assurances of impartiality and due process instilled by adjudication, the
125. Law Commission of Canada, TransformingRelationships through Participatory Justice (Ottawa:
Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2003) at 121.
478 The Dalhousie Law Journal
judge will be required to verify that acceptance does not impugn judicial
integrity in the manner contemplated by the incompatibility doctrine.
Occasionally, as in the case of Justice Murray Sinclair's leadership of the
TRC, a judge may be able to credibly answer each of these questions in
the affirmative. The position advocated here is that judges should err on
the side of caution, however, and confine themselves to tasks that call for
the enforcement of adjudicative values. A principled boundary to judicial
service, and proper alignment of procedural forms and functions, is thus
assured, guarding against the encroachment of legal epistemologies on
improper terrain.
Conclusion
Judge-led public inquiries continue to play important roles addressing
matters of serious public concern in both Canada and Australia. No less
important than the factual conclusions they reach are the values instilled
by the processes leading to those conclusions. In Canada, relatively little
attention has been devoted to separation of powers concerns that attend
judicial service in such inquiries. This is surprising given the formal
classification of inquiries as investigative processes, and the common-
sense understanding that inquiries often address highly controversial and
politically-charged subjects. The Australian doctrine of incompatibility
draws these separation of powers concerns to the fore, stressing that
even when judges assume extra-judicial roles, they must still honour
values of independence and due process central to ensuring their
personal integrity, and the integrity of the judiciary as a whole. While
the doctrine will be illuminating to Canadian jurists, it does not resolve
the unique dilemmas confronted by judges upon assuming the leadership
of a public inquiry. Judicial commissioners face an inevitable tension
between their independence and the political character of inquiries, and
between the investigative mandates of inquiries and fairness to inquiry
participants. These tensions arise in practical ways-for example, in
conflicts concerning the funding of inquiry participants, or in establishing
appropriate boundaries in a commissioner's relationship with his or her
counsel. Resolving these tensions involves confronting the question of
why judges should serve in public inquiries to begin with. The received
wisdom is that the judicial commissioner can depart significantly from
the procedural and substantive commitments of adjudication; however, a
closer examination of those commitments challenges that wisdom.
When we distil the social value that adjudication is meant to achieve-
the special assurance of justice it affords to participants through structural
equality in the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments to a neutral
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arbiter-we may also identify a place for that value in certain types of
public inquiry. These are inquiries that involve conflict as to the existence
and nature of wrongs and the appropriate attribution of responsibility.
Here, the legitimate fairness demands of participants-both those making
and those subject to serious allegations-warrant the instantiation of
adjudicative procedures. This is not to say that inquiries are exclusively
adjudicative. Rather, it is to say that adjudication should be honoured in
their formal, evidentiary hearings, and that recognizing this role would
improve their conduct without diminishing the value of parallel inquiry
processes, including research and community consultation.
Recognizing the place for adjudication in public inquiries also helps
define clearer limits to their judicial leadership. I argue for a cautionary
approach in which judges decline to assume commissions that are ill-suited
to adjudication, barring special confidence that they possess the requisite
ability to develop deliberately non-judicial procedures and to do so in a
manner that preserves the integrity of their judicial office. Accordingly,
while my thesis supports greater formality in the procedural structure
of some inquiries, it also supports a narrowing of instances in which
those inquiries should be employed. Where societal goals of restorative
justice, healing, and reconciliation are paramount, alternative deliberative
processes to the judicial inquiry should be considered. Judges possess
a unique set of abilities and procedural understandings that reflect their
role under the separation of powers. Their service in non-judicial settings
should reflect that role.

